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INTRODUCTION
American detectives frequently use an interrogation tactic that is
unseemly or even repellant, but rarely discussed: they minimize the moral
wrongfulness of the crime. Moral minimization involves the interrogator
trivializing the crime or offering moral excuses and justifications for its
commission, attempting to convince the suspect that even the police do not
regard the suspected criminal conduct to be seriously wrong. As an
example, consider this script from the most popular interrogation training
manual, for an employee theft suspect:
Egads, man, how in the world can anybody with a family the
size of yours get along on that kind of money in this day and
age? . . . Anyone else confronted with a similar situation
probably would have done the same thing, Joe. Your
company is at fault. . . . I can tell you this—if you received a
decent salary in the first place, you wouldn’t be here.1
Interrogators here minimize the theft by saying that “anyone” in the same
situation would have done the same, and blame the victim by suggesting
that the employer was at fault for paying a miserly wage.
As we show, victim-blaming is a very common form of
minimization, but there are several other techniques: diminishing the harm
the suspect caused the victim, emphasizing how common the crime is,
finding honorable motives for the crime, and shifting the blame to society or
others, in addition to the victim. American interrogators are trained to focus
much of their attention on developing the right theme of moral
minimization, to present that theme in a monologue near the beginning of
the interrogation, and to refer back to it regularly.
Why do interrogators work to minimize the seriousness of the
crime? That question is our focus, and we find three possible answers. One
1

FRED E. INBAU, JOHN E. REID, JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY & BRIAN C. JAYNE, CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 223 (5th ed. 2013) (proposing the script for an employee
theft interrogation).
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possibility is that the tactic is simply misguided and does not contribute to
the law enforcement interest in confessions. The world of interrogation is
not the world of science and data. Interrogators learn from and follow a
conventional wisdom that lacks a solid empirical grounding. So it would not
be very surprising if moral minimization contributed nothing to the causal
efficacy of interrogation. If so, the tactic is an unfortunate waste of limited
resources, consuming scarce time for training interrogators and scarce time
for interrogating suspects.2
A second possibility is that moral minimization induces true
confessions by conveying a promise or prediction of official leniency. If
detectives do not take the crime seriously and sympathize with the
offender’s motive for offending, then the suspect may infer that the
prosecutor and judge will also view the crime as less serious and worthy of
less punishment. However plausible, no one defending the tactic would
offer this understanding of its effects because the law of confessions
disfavors police promises of leniency. The sound and long-standing judicial
reasoning is that such promises may induce the innocent to confess,
especially given that American interrogators are allowed to lie to the
suspect about evidence of their guilt. A modern psychological literature on
false confessions raises the concern that minimization promises leniency by
implication, so this “defense” of the practice would actually condemn it.3
So we reach the final explanation for moral minimization, which is
the one advocated by the interrogation manuals that teach its use. The
manuals claim that the tactic works to induce true confessions by lowering
the psychological costs of confessing to the interrogators.4 By making the
crime seem less shameful, the guilty suspect will feel less shame in
admitting guilt to the detectives in the interrogation room. Again, there is no
empirical testing that validates this theory, and there is certainly room for
skepticism. Nonetheless, we agree that this account is plausible. Officially
endorsed rationalizations for criminality are likely to be powerful because
they are surprising – coming from law enforcement officials the suspect

2

See infra text accompanying notes 122-124.
See infra text accompanying notes 125-128.
4
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 203–04.
3
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expects to strongly disapprove of felonies – and are delivered persistently
and sympathetically in the intimate setting of an interrogation room.
In this article, we assume that this psychological account is correct,
i.e., that minimization is neither a mistake nor does it work by impliedly
promising official leniency. We then demonstrate what unexpectedly
follows if one takes the psychological account seriously.5 If moral
minimization lowers the internal costs of confessing to crimes, it also
lowers the internal costs of committing crimes. Thus, if moral minimization
actually works as advertised, it does something worse than just wasting
scarce resources; it risks promoting recidivism.6
We identify several legal and psychological literatures that support
our claim that moral minimization risks increasing recidivism. First and
foremost, the interrogation manuals explain the tactic’s effectiveness by
pointing to a psychological theory – neutralization – that holds that people
are more likely to offend if they can first neutralize the shame and guilt they
would ordinarily experience from committing a crime.7 In other words,
many offenders have internalized the social norms against violent and
fraudulent behavior that the criminal law enforces, but will still offend if
they can mentally diminish the norm’s psychological power with some
superficially plausible moral justification or excuse. The avowed aim of
moral minimization is to “reinforce” this process of deflecting guilt and
shame. Ironically, then, the same theory that explains why moral
minimization will disinhibit an individual’s confession of crime predicts
that minimization will disinhibit the individual’s subsequent commission of
crime.

5

There is a legal and psychological literature discussing whether the accusatory style of
interrogation, which includes minimization and other tactics, causes false confessions. See
infra note 15. This article focuses only on moral minimization and our contribution lies in
identifying two novel adverse consequences of that tactic.
6
In another article, we identify a second cost: the training and practice of victim-blaming
(one type of moral minimization) adversely affects policing and policing culture. The sexist
stereotypes used to blame women, for example, reinforce hyper-masculine police culture,
which impedes the investigation of domestic and sexual assaults of women.
7
See infra Part II-B-1.
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Alongside neutralization, we explore six social science or legal
theories that buttress our criminogenic claim: moral disengagement theory,8
the concept of the marginal offender,9 restorative justice research,10 the
entrapment defense,11 the social norms literature,12 and research on legal
legitimacy.13 Each of these discourses points in the same direction: moral
minimization weakens internal and/or informal motivations for legal
compliance. The tactic is likely to be criminogenic. No one has previously
explored the social science that draws the connection between interrogation
practices and their criminogenic risks.14
As we explain, moral minimization is most likely to encourage
recidivism when the offender’s motivation to comply with criminal law is
real but marginal (i.e., someone who may offend but still experiences guilt
and shame for offending) and the minimizations are generalizable (i.e.,
applicable to future criminal opportunities), conditions that apply frequently
to crimes like theft, assault, and sexual assault.15 These conditions are less
likely to apply to certain offenses, such as homicide, for reasons we explore.
But the fact that no one has ever considered these risks makes it certain that
police currently use the tactic in some cases where the criminogenic costs
substantially exceed the interrogation benefits.
We consider various objections to our claim, most prominently the
possibility that the subsequent prosecution, conviction, and punishment of
the offender will undo any criminogenic effects of moral minimization by
sending a counter-message validating the moral seriousness of the offense
and the offender’s responsibility. As we explain, for a variety of reasons,
8

See infra Part II-B-2.
See infra Part II-B-3.
10
See infra Part II-B-4.
11
See infra Part II-B-5.
12
See infra Part II-B-6-a.
13
See infra Part II-B-6-b.
14
A partial exception is Anne Coughlin, who drew attention to the misogynistic tropes
in rape interrogations and “speculat[ed]” about the effect on rapists. See Anne M. Coughlin,
Interrogation Stories, 95 VA. L. REV. 1599, 1599 (2009). Coughlin’s focus is different than
ours in various ways, as her concern is limited to the crime of rape, she does not discuss the
general tactic of “minimization,” and her framework is narrative theory rather than
neutralization or the other social science theories we employ.
15
See infra Part II-C.
9
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this objection is not compelling.16 We consider specific actors in the system
– attorneys, judges, jurors, and victims – and conclude that none of them are
likely to send an effective counter-message that offsets the detective’s moral
minimization and undoes its criminogenic damage, at least not when, as is
currently the case, there is no awareness of the risks that minimization
poses.
A final word of introduction: in a separate article, we argue that the
specific moral minimization tactic of victim-blaming risks a second
negative consequence.17 The interrogation training in and practice of victimblaming produces a cadre of detectives more inclined to blame victims,
making them worse at the investigation of certain violent crimes, especially
those against women.
We proceed as follows. Part I describes the evidence that police
detectives employ moral minimization extensively. From the case law, we
show the exact wording of real world interrogations. Part II explores the
tactic’s criminogenic risks, based on neutralization theory and six other
legal or social science literatures. We identify the factors that determine the
magnitude of the risk and answer the objection that the criminal process
undoes the damage of moral minimization. Part III addresses the normative
implications – what should be done to limit the risks of moral minimization.
Part IV concludes.
I. MORAL MINIMIZATION IN AMERICAN POLICE INTERROGATIONS
The United States and a few other nations predominantly employ a
“confrontational” or “accusatory” method of interrogation, in contrast to the
“information-gathering” methods favored by the United Kingdom and other
nations.18 The confrontational method prominently includes the tactics
16

See infra Part II-C.
See Margareth Etienne and Richard H. McAdams, Training Detectives to Blame
Victims, draft on file with authors.
18
See Christian A. Meissner, et al., Improving the Effectiveness of Suspect
Interrogations, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 211, 216 (“One primary distinction has been
proposed between the use of accusatorial approaches in North America and the development
of information-gathering approaches in the United Kingdom, Australia, and elsewhere.”).
17
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known as maximization and minimization. For the former, interrogators
maximize the apparent certainty they have of the suspect’s guilt, suggesting
that the evidence is decisive, cutting off and rejecting protestations of
innocence, and on some occasions falsely describing evidence of guilt.19 For
minimization, interrogators suggest mitigating factors for the suspect’s
behavior which make it less appear less culpable or even fully justified.
Within the category of minimization, our focus is on moral
minimizations. We define that subcategory in Part A. Part B explores the
content of the tactic, relying on widely used interrogation manuals. Part C
documents the extensive use of moral minimization in real world
interrogations based on surveys, observational studies, and case law. Part D
roughly estimates how frequently American detectives morally minimize
criminal offenses each year.
A. Moral Minimization Defined
Although the training manuals we survey below do not explicitly
make the distinction, there are two principal types of minimization: legal
and moral. Legal minimization suggests to suspects that the crime may not
be as legally serious as they believe or perhaps they have a legally valid
defense. In a homicide investigation, for example, the detective may suggest
that the suspect could have killed the victim accidentally or in self-defense,
though the manuals advise caution when relying on a theme that implies
official leniency, given that courts may exclude confessions produced by
false promises of prosecutorial leniency.20 Nonetheless, where the strategy
is used, investigators hope to get closer to confessions by inviting suspects
to accept a version of the facts that appears to lessen their legal liability
while nonetheless connecting them to the crime.

19

See DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS
135 (2012) (explaining maximization tactics as including, in the absence of “powerful
incriminating evidence,” that “interrogators often fabricate it and deceive the suspect into
believing it exists”).
20
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 203, 425; BRIAN JAYNE & JOSEPH BUCKLEY, A FIELD
GUIDE TO THE REID TECHNIQUE 277–79 (2014) [hereinafter JAYNE & BUCKLEY, FIELD
GUIDE] “[T]he theme should not provide the suspect with a legal defense for his criminal
behavior.” Id. at 276.
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Moral minimization, however, is our focus. With moral
minimization, the interrogator seeks to persuade the suspect that, whatever
the law might say, her conduct is morally excused or justified, at least to
some degree, so the crime is not a serious moral transgression. Decades ago,
the Supreme Court in Miranda described this technique in its review of
interrogation practices: “Like other men, perhaps the subject has had a bad
family life, had an unhappy childhood, had too much to drink, had an
unrequited desire for women. The officers are instructed to minimize the
moral seriousness of the offense, to cast blame on the victim or on
society.”21 Miranda illustrated the technique with facts from its 1954 case
of Leyra v. Denno,22 where the interrogator, a psychiatrist, had said to the
accused, “We do sometimes things that are not right, but in a fit of temper
or anger we sometimes do things we aren't really responsible for,” and
again, “We know that morally you were just in anger. Morally, you are not
to be condemned.”23
The remainder of this part demonstrates the nature and frequency of
moral minimization.
B. The Reid Interrogation Manuals and Moral Minimization
To move beyond generalities, we explore the most influential
interrogation manuals, those defining the “Reid” technique.24 Miranda
relied on, among other sources, the second edition of the police training
guide by Fred E. Inbau and John E. Reid, titled Criminal Interrogation and
Confessions.25 Since Miranda, the Supreme Court has twice referenced
21

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 450 (1966).
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
23
Appendix to Opinion of the Court, id. at 562, 582; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450 n.12.
24
See Dylan J. French, The Cutting Edge of Confession Evidence: Redefining Coercion
and Reforming Police Interrogation Techniques in the American Criminal Justice System,
97 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1034–35 (2019) (“While there are different styles of accusatory
interrogation, all major tropes can be traced back to a man named John E. Reid and his
original work . . . . [T]he Reid Manual, affectionately known as the Interrogator's Bible, has
set the standard.”).
25
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448–49 n.9 (1966) (citing FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS (2nd ed. 1962), and noting that the first
edition of the Inbau & Reid manual was a revision and enlargement of an earlier text by the
authors, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (3d ed. 1953)). Chief Justice
22
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Reid interrogation manuals, reflecting its dominant position in the field.26
John E. Reid & Associates, Inc. remains the leading authority on police
interrogations, through its training manuals27 and courses.28 Reid states that
“hundreds of thousands of investigators have received [its] training,”29 a
claim substantiated by an independent survey of law enforcement
personnel, which found that over half had received instruction on the Reid
technique.30 Criminal Interrogation and Confession is now in its fifth
edition, published in 2013, and we refer to it as “the manual.”
Warren noted that the three leading texts on interrogation – two of which were authored by
Inbau, Reid and associates – had total combined sales and circulation of over 44,000. Id.
26
See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 610 n.2 (2004) (citing two Reid manuals and
one other to show what “[m]ost police manuals” advise about Miranda warnings); Stansbury
v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324 (1994) (citing the Reid manual as evidence that an aspect of
Miranda doctrine was “well settled”).
27
The primary manual is the newest edition of the one Miranda cited: INBAU, ET AL.,
supra note 1. A separate abridged version is FRED E. INBAU, JOHN E. REID, JOSEPH P.
BUCKLEY & BRIAN C. JAYNE, ESSENTIALS OF THE REID TECHNIQUE: CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter INBAU, ET AL., ESSENTIALS].
There are at least four related texts published by John E. Reid and Associates, Inc., some in
the second edition: BRIAN C. JAYNE & JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY, THE INVESTIGATOR ANTHOLOGY
(2d ed. 2014) (described as “a compilation of articles and essays about The Reid Technique”)
[hereinafter JAYNE & BUCKLEY, ANTHOLOGY]; JAYNE & BUCKLEY, ANTHOLOGY]; JAYNE &
BUCKLEY, FIELD GUIDE, supra note 20; LOUIS C. SENESE, ANATOMY OF INTERROGATION
THEMES: THE REID TECHNIQUE OF INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION (2d ed. 2020); and
DAVID M. BUCKLEY, HOW TO IDENTIFY, INTERVIEW, AND MOTIVATE CHILD ABUSE
OFFENDERS TO TELL THE TRUTH (2d ed. 2015).
28
See also SIMON, supra note 19, at 121–22 (“[U]sed most widely by American law
enforcement agencies . . . the Reid Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation has been
taught to well over 100,000 law enforcement agents.”). In addition to its books and DVDs,
Reid offers training seminars and certificate training programs through its Institute. See
Store, JOHN E. REID & ASSOCS, INC. (last visited Jan. 21, 2022),
https://reid.com/store/products.
29
See INBAU, ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 27, at viii. Beyond law enforcement, the
method is popular with private security personnel employed to detect and prevent theft and
fraud. See “How to Conduct Better Interviews & Interrogations,” Security Director's Report
of the Institute of Management and Administration (IOMA), issue 02–12, p.11 (December
2002) (“When asked which vendors they rely on most for building their own skills and that
of staff, a whopping 80% of security pros cited John E. Reid & Associates.”).
30
See N. Dickon Reppucci, et al., Custodial Interrogation of Juveniles: Results on a
National Survey of Police, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT
RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 67 (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian
A. Meissner eds. 2010) (reporting that 54% of respondents had been trained in the Reid
technique). See also Melissa B. Russano et al., Structured Interviews of Experienced
HUMINT Interrogators, 28 APPL. COG. PSYCH. 847, 848–50 (2014) (reporting on a survey
of 42 experienced federal interrogators, half from law enforcement and half from the
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The Reid Technique has nine steps.31 Step one is the direct, positive
confrontation, in which the detective expresses confidence in the guilt of the
suspect.32 Step two – our subject – is “Theme Development.”33 The term
“theme” refers only to what we call moral minimization; the manual
explains that a “theme” is a “monologue presented by the interrogator in
which reasons and excuses are offered that will serve to psychologically
justify or minimize the moral seriousness of the suspect’s criminal
behavior.”34 The Reid manual explains that ‘it is natural for [the offender]
to justify or rationalize the crime in some manner” and that “[m]ost
interrogation themes reinforce the guilty suspect’s own rationalizations and
justifications for committing the crime”35 “Psychologists refer to this
internal process [of rationalization] as techniques of neutralization,”36 a
topic to which we will return. (Even the competitors of the Reid technique
use this particular tactic37).
military, in which 50% indicated they had received formal training in the Reid technique, the
highest percentage of any source).
31
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 187–90.
32
Id., at 192–98.
33
Id. at 202–55; INBAU, ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 27, at 115–35. See also SENESE,
supra note 27, which is a 342-page supplemental manual devoted entirely to “interrogation
themes.”
34
INBAU, ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 27, at 115.
35
Id. See also id. at 210 (“The interrogation theme represents a persuasive effort on the
part of the investigator to reinforce those existing excuses or rationalizations within the guilty
suspect’s mind”); JAYNE & BUCKLEY, FIELD GUIDE, supra note 20, at 276 (“For a guilty
suspect to relate to an interrogation theme, the justifications offered by the investigator must
be similar to how the suspect himself justified the crime.”).
36
Id. at n.7, 325–26 (emphasis added) (citing MICHAEL J. LILLYQUIST, UNDERSTANDING
AND CHANGING CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 153–60 (1980) and Heith Copes, et al., Bridging the
Gap Between Research and Practice: How Neutralization Theory Can Inform Reid
Interrogations of Identity Thieves, 18 J. CRIM. JUST. EDUC. 444 (2007).
37
For example, the Zulawski & Wicklander interrogation method differs in critical ways
from the Reid Technique, but the former also devote a chapter to “rationalizations,” which
are essentially minimizations. See DAVID E. ZULAWSKI & DOUGLAS E. WICKLANDER,
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION 305 (2d ed. 2002) (recommending
a “one-sided discussion presented to the suspect by the interrogator, who offers excuses or
reasons that minimize the seriousness of the crime.”). The corporation, Wicklander-Zulawski
& Associates, Inc., parted ways with the Reid method in 2017 over concerns that it leads to
false confessions. See Liz Martinez, Security, Law Enforcement React to Change in U.S.
Interrogation Technique: Wicklander-Zulawski Decision to Drop the ‘Reid Method' Has
Generated Mixed Opinions, SECURITYINFOWATCH.COM (Mar. 10, 2017), at
https://www.securityinfowatch.com/security-executives/article/12314618/security-law-
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Developing this kind of minimizing theme takes time, which is why
the manual describes it as a “monologue.” “For a theme to be effective, the
investigator must be able to maintain a continuous monologue of theme
material.”38 During an interrogation that may last hours, “[t]he investigator
must continue offering the suspect a theme.”39 To avoid a theme statement
that “only lasts a few minutes,” the manuals offer several ways to “draw out
the length of a theme.”40 Thus, even though most of the examples below are
short, it is important to remember that they are mere illustrations of a brief
moment in what is supposed to be an extensive, repeated development of
the theme.
The manuals offer specific minimization themes. First is
“Sympathize with the Suspect by Saying That Anyone Else Under Similar
Conditions or Circumstances Might Have Done the Same Thing.”41 Inbau
and co-authors explain: “A criminal offender . . . derives considerable
mental relief and comfort from the investigator’s assurance that anyone else
under similar conditions or circumstances might have done the same
thing.”42 The manual cautions against promising legal leniency, but notes:
“There is, of course, no legal objection to extending sympathy and
understanding in order to feed into the suspect’s own justifications for his
criminal behavior . . . .”43
The manual offers two illustrations. One concerns a hit-and-run
suspect, and this script is said to be drawn from an actual case: “Your car
hit something. You were not sure what it was, but you had some doubts; so

enforcement-react-to-change-in-us-interrogation-technique. But the Wicklander-Zulawski
shift does not abandon their focus on “rationalizations.”
38
JAYNE & BUCKLEY, ANTHOLOGY, supra note 27, at 165.
39
JAYNE & BUCKLEY, FIELD GUIDE, supra note 20, at 271 (offering to answer the
question “How can a theme last 30, 60, or even 90 minutes?”).
40
JAYNE & BUCKLEY, ANTHOLOGY, supra note 27, at 165 (section titled “Expanding the
Duration of the Theme”). Part of the technique here is to present some themes as not being
about the suspect (and his or her motivation), but about third parties or personal stories of
the interrogator. Id.
41
INBAU, ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 27, at 210.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 211.
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you got excited and drove away . . . . You are no different than anyone else
and, under the same circumstances, I probably would have done what you
yourself did.”44 The second example concerns sexual assault, where the
manual advises “indicat[ing] to the suspect that the investigator has a friend
or relative who indulged in the same kind of conduct . . . [I] t may even be
appropriate for the investigator himself to acknowledge that he has been
tempted to indulge in the same behavior.”45
The Reid manual’s second minimization theme is: “Reduce the
Suspect’s Feeling of Guilt by Minimizing the Moral Seriousness of the
Offense.”46 The initial illustration is, again, sexual assault, where the
manual offers the following script, “has been found effective”:
In matters of sex, we’re very close to most animals, so don’t
think you’re the only human being – or that your one of a
very few – who ever did anything like this. There are plenty
of others, and these things happen every day and to many
persons, and they will continue to happen for many, many
years to come.47
The manual also refers to an actual spousal murder case in which
“the deceased wife had treated her husband miserably over the years” and
the interrogator’s theme was as follows:

44

Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 211 (emphasis added). We shall discuss a California
case where the detective followed this advice. See infra text accompanying notes 118–119.
See also Coughlin, supra note 14, at 1650–51 (describing how the third edition of the Reid
manual recounted a case in which the interrogator stated that he “himself, as a young man in
high school, ‘roughed it up’ with a girl in an attempt to have intercourse with her.”).
46
Id. See also ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note 37, at 317 (explaining that “the
interrogator also minimizes the seriousness of the crime from the suspect’s perspective. . . .
saying, ‘And sometimes it’s really nothing more than an error in judgment, a mistake’”) and
331 (“Nobody is perfect. A lot of time, our mistakes seem a lot bigger than they probably
are.”).
47
Id. at 211–12. This script has been in the Reid manuals since the first edition. See
FRED. E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 36 (1962)
[hereinafter INBAU & REID, FIRST EDITION].
45
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Joe, as recently as just last week, my wife made me so angry
with her nagging that I felt I couldn’t stand it anymore, but
just as she was at her worst, there was a ringing of the
doorbell by friends from out of town. Was I glad they came!
Otherwise, I don’t know what I would have done. You were
not so lucky as I was on that occasion.48
If this gendered script sounds like it comes from an earlier era, that’s
because it did; the example has been used without alteration since the first
edition of the Reid manual in 1962.49
The final illustration of this second theme involves employee theft
crimes, where the manual recommends using statistics on the ubiquity of
such crimes. For example, to minimize the seriousness of stealing from an
employer, the interrogator could invoke the claim noted in one Reid manual
that “75% of employees steal from the workplace” and that “most do so
repeatedly.”50
The third specific minimization theme is: “Suggest a Less Revolting
and More Morally Acceptable Motivation or Reason for the Offense than
That Which is Known or Presumed.”51 The manual offers several
illustrations including that the suspect committed the crime only because
alcohol or drugs had impaired his judgment, that a suspected embezzler
only intended to borrow the money and would have replaced it if not for the
discovery, and that a thief took “money . . . for the benefit of a spouse,
child, or another person.”52 The manual offers a table listing self-serving
48

INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 212.
See INBAU & REID, FIRST EDITION, supra note 47, at 37.
50
See SENESE, supra note 27, at 141. The main manual includes a lower estimate of onethird of all employees. INBAU, ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION, supra note 27, at 213–14
(listing a number of bullet points about the high frequency of employee theft). One of the
non-Reid manuals notes how easy it is for employees to rationalize workplace theft. See
ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note 37, at 306.
51
Id. at 214.
52
See INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 215. See also ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra
note 37, at 339 (recommending that the interrogator “minimizes the loss” by suggesting that
the suspect “had intended to return the money or property” and was only borrowing it). See
also id. at 332 (“Medical bills, family problems, and financial pressures are things that can
push a person into doing something he never dreamed he would do. We all have our breaking
49
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motives that offenders have offered during confessions for each of eleven
different crimes.53
The fourth specific theme merits special attention: “Sympathize with
the Suspect by Condemning Others,” a subpart of which is “Condemning
the victim.”54 “[T]he investigator should develop the theme that the primary
blame, or at least some of the blame, for what the suspect did rests upon the
victim.”55 Or, as the manual puts it at one point, the strategy is to
“degrad[e] the character of the victim.”56
There are suggestions here for blaming victims of assault and
robbery.57 Referencing again “the case of a man suspected of killing his
wife,” the manual says that the investigator portrayed the suspect’s wife as
an “unbearable”
creature . . . who would either drive a man insane or else to
the commission of an act such as the present one in which
she herself was the victim. In this respect, however, the
points.”). This family motive, when genuine, and especially in extreme cases, would actually
mitigate the offense in a way that a judge should consider in sentencing. If the criminal
system will actually reduce the sentence because of a mitigating factor, there is no harm to
interrogation that incorporates that mitigation (or any other such genuine factor). We note,
however, that few of the moral minimizations are relevant in this way. Efforts to trivialize
the offense and blame the victim fall outside of a legitimate sentencing judgment.
53
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 216–17. See also ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra
note 37, at 325 (“First, the interrogator might use frustration at being unable to control the
child’s crying . . . [and second] the strength of an adult and the fragility of a small child.”).
54
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 220. The other suggestions are “Condemning the
accomplice” and “Condemning anyone else upon whom some degree of moral responsibility
might conceivably be placed.” Id. at 224, 227. See also ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra
note 37, at 306 (advising “the interrogator to create the perception of transferring guilt to
someone . . . other than the suspect. . . . [thereby] psychologically minimizing the seriousness
of the suspect’s offense.”).
55
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 220. See also ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note
37, at 333–34 (noting that “[t]he victim can be blamed in almost any crime from homicide
to a sex crime to theft. The guilt is transferred to the victim by the interrogator, who portrays
the suspect as a victim of circumstances.”).
56
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 222 (emphasis added).
57
See id. (“In assault cases, the victim may be referred to as someone who . . . finally
got what was coming to him.”) and id. (“In a robbery case, the victim may be blamed for
having previously cheated the suspect . . . [or] for ‘flashing money’ or putting the suspect
down in front of friends.”).
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investigator stated that the suspect’s wife was just like most
other women. He also said that many married men avoid
similar difficulties by becoming drunkards, cheats, and
deserters, but unfortunately the suspect tried to do what was
right by ‘sticking it out,’ and it got the better of him in the
end.”58
In making such appeals, the manual recommends empathy:
[M]uch can be gained by the investigator’s adoption of an
emotional (‘choked up’) feeling about it all as he relates
what is known about the victim’s conduct toward her spouse.
This demonstrable attitude of sympathy and understanding
may be rather easily assumed by placing one’s self ‘in the
other fellow’s shoes’ and pondering this question: ‘What
might I have done under similar circumstances’?59
Although there is no separate example for domestic battery (as
opposed to domestic murder), the manual’s logic of victim-blaming
endorses the same approach there as well.
Regarding sex offenses, the suggested blame-the-victim theme is:
“The victim initially came on to the suspect and he acted the way any man
would under the circumstances.”60 The Reid manual offers specific scripts,
such as this one:
Joe, this girl was having a lot of fun for herself by letting you
kiss her and feel her breasts. For her, that would have been
sufficient. But men aren’t built the same way. There’s a limit
to the teasing and excitement they can take; then something’s
got to give. A female ought to recognize this, and if she’s not

58

INBAU, ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 27, at 148–49.
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1 at 221 (emphasis added).
60
Id., at 204 (emphasis added).
59
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willing to go all the way, she ought to stop way short of what
this gal allowed you to do.61
The Reid manuals recommend similar themes when the sexual abuse
victim is a child.62
These examples are from the current edition of the main manual
published in 2013, which is before the greater salience of the “Me Too”
movement. However, a more recent supplemental Reid text from 2020
provides similar examples and states that “the most common theme to
develop in sexual assaults is to blame the victim for doing something that
provoked the suspect.”63
Given the recommendation of misogynistic insults of victims, one
wonders whether racial or other stereotypes are also used as a minimization
theme. Interestingly, the current edition of the main Reid manual
comprehensively ignores the issue of race,64 a curious omission in light of
(a) its frequent endorsement of sexist stereotypes and (b) a brief reference to
race in earlier editions.65 The primary Reid manual does not address hate
61

Id. at 222 (proposing the script for a rape interrogation).
See id., at 204 (“Suggested theme: Having sexual contact with a child the age of the
victim (who was nine years old) is much more understandable than if the suspect had the
same contact with a two-year-old girl.”); id. at 221 (offering theme blaming rape on victim’s
revealing clothing); ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note 37, at 334 (“The suspect became
involved because the victim dressed or acted in a certain way.”). In the supplemental Reid
manual specific to child abuse, BUCKLEY, supra note 27, there are examples that seem to
distinguish the suspect’s “perception” from reality, id. at 220, but other recommended themes
lack this nuance: “Blame the child’s curiosity; they brought up the subject of sex.” Id. at 223,
and “Present the argument that children are more mature in today’s society . . . due to
television, movies, magazines, news reports, the internet and social media. They are exposed
to sex at an early age and are curious to experiment with sex.” Id. See also ZULAWSKI &
WICKLANDER, supra note 37, at 334 (“The interrogator can even blame a child victim of
sexual abuse for appearing older and tempting the suspect.”).
63
See SENESE, supra note 27, at 224 (first emphasis added; second in original).
64
There is no entry on the subject of race in the index of a 450+ page book.
65
In the first edition of the Reid Manual, in 1962, at 115, there was a section titled “An
Unintelligent, Uneducated Criminal Offender, with a Low Cultural Background, Should Be
Interrogated on a Psychological Level Comparable to That Usually Employed in the
Questioning of a Child Respecting an Act of Wrongdoing.” One passage of that section
raised the issue of race:
In instances where a subject of the type of under consideration
62
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crimes, but the obvious logic of victim-blaming in these cases is clear: if
rape crimes require misogynistic themes, as the manuals claim, then hate
crimes would seem to require racist, homophobic, or Islamophobic themes,
or others of a similar nature, whatever might have motivated the suspect to
commit the crime. Moreover, this logic seems to apply not just to what are
technically hate-crimes but to any crime where the suspect and victim are of
different races (or ethnicities, religions, etc.) because the suspect might have
rationalized the offense with bigoted and stereotyped reasoning. If a simple
theft crime is cross-racial, for example, a detective following the technique
might experiment with a theme that members of the victim’s racial (or
other) group have plenty of money to spare or acquire their money by
nefarious means.
Theft cases are another major opportunity for victim-blaming. For
employee theft cases, the primary manual states: “[T]he employer should be
condemned for having paid inadequate and insufficient salaries or for some
unethical or careless practice that may have created a temptation to steal.”66
We saw one such script in the introduction.67 Another suggests proposing to
a maid accused of theft that she stole fur coats because the owner had so
many and didn’t treat them well.68
happens to be a member of a minority race or group, the interrogator must
never make a derogatory remark about that race or group. (Nor should he
assume that a person's attitude, conduct, or even his criminality are the
result of the color of his skin or his nationality!) To the contrary, the
interrogator should (and in good conscience he always can) eulogize some
outstanding member of that race or group and suggest that the subject try
to measure up to the conduct exemplified by that particular individual.
Id. at 116. The same text exists in the second edition of 1966, but the entire section is
omitted starting with the third edition of 1986. While we applaud the statement that the
interrogator should not assume that race determines criminality, it is disturbing that race was
discussed in the book only in reference to “unintelligent” suspects “with a Low Cultural
Background.”
66
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 222. See also id. at 204 (“[B]lame the company for
their poor security.”); id. at 223 (“[A]n employer may be blamed for some perceived unfair
treatment of the suspect”); ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note 37, at 312 (recommending
“rationalizations that placed blame on financial problems” caused by medical problems); id.
at 333 (“Bob, if this happened out of frustration because of the way your boss picked on
you”).
67
See supra text accompanying note 1.
68
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 223. See also SENESE, supra note 27, at 141–47
(describing nineteen minimization themes for employee theft, many involving victim-
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Finally, the Reid manuals also recommend casting blame on targets
other than the victim – accomplices, society, government, parents, or other
relatives.69 For example, when the suspect is a juvenile, blame the parents,
suggesting that the suspect was “worse off than an orphan.”70 “When the
offense is theft,” blame “a spendthrift wife or the financial burden of a
child.”71 Or the suspect’s creditors may be blamed for pressuring for
repayment and “’forc[ing]’ him to steal.”72 Bringing in politics, the
suspected embezzler’s behavior may be compared favorably to the national
government’s behavior in “squeez[ing] citizens with burdensome taxes to
obtain money to waste on foreign countries.”73 For hate crimes, “Blame the
liberal politicians for creating an unfair situation by ‘selling out’ for the
vote by enacting laws that favor the victimized individual’s group,” and
“Blame the government for reverse discrimination.”74 In the actual wifemurder interrogation, the investigator blamed the wife’s family for
meddling, stating “[a]t one point,” that “probably the relatives themselves
deserved to be shot.”75
Returning to sexual assault examples, the Reid manual offers a
variety of other targets for blame: pornography, the internet, or “differing
cultural beliefs.”76 “A person who has taken indecent sexual liberties with a
young girl may be told that her parents are to blame for letting her roam
around by herself as they did.”77 If the suspect is married, the interrogator
blaming); ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note 37, at 334 (“’Cindy, I don’t know how
you can make it on just $7.00 per hour.’”); id. at 335 (recommending interrogators blame the
victim’s poor security as creating too great a temptation for theft).
69
See INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 224–30. See also ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER,
supra note 37, at 310 (recommending the blaming of parents for giving too much attention
to the suspect’s sibling).
70
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 251.
71
Id. at 228.
72
Id. at 229.
73
Id. at 230.
74
SENESE, supra note 27, at 170–72.
75
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 227.
76
See SENESE, supra note 27, at 226.
77
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 228. See also BUCKLEY, supra note 27 at 222 (“Blame
the victim’s parents for not showing any love or attention to the victim . . . . [or] allowing
their child to spend the night, go on a camping trip, ski outing, etc.”). This is in addition to
blaming society and the media. Id. at 224.
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can cast blame on the suspect’s wife, as with this script: “If your wife had
taken care of you sexually . . . you wouldn’t be here now. You’re a healthy
male; you needed and were entitled to sexual intercourse. When a fellow
like you doesn’t get it at home, he seeks it elsewhere.”78
This final strategy of blaming women, like the others, comes from
the latest Reid manual published in 2013, though it also traces back to the
first edition of 1962.79
C. Moral Minimization in Real World Interrogations
Do police follow the manuals that recommend moral minimization?
A variety of evidence confirms that they do. David Simon, a journalistic
observer of the first order, famously spent a year embedded with the
homicide unit of the Baltimore Police Department.80 He described their
interrogation techniques, including moral minimization, in this passage:
Beat your child to death and a police detective will wrap his
arm around you in the interrogation room, telling you about
how he beats his own children all the time, how it wasn’t
your fault if the kid up and died on you. Kill your woman
and a good detective will come close to real tears as he
touches your shoulder and tells you how he knows that you
must have loved her, that it wouldn’t be so hard for you to
talk about if you didn’t.”81
Simon did not quantify the number of interrogations he observed,
but in one study criminologist Richard Leo observed 182 felony
interrogations.82 Leo separately categorized two tactics that involve the type
78

INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 228 (emphasis added). See also BUCKLEY, supra note
27, at 222 (“This is exemplified by offender #3 who had an incestuous relationship with his
teenage daughters after his wife refused to have sex with him . . . . In a case like this the
investigator would suggest, ‘If your wife would have taken care of you the way she was
supposed to this would never have happened.”).
79
See INBAU & REID, FIRST EDITION, supra note 47, at 51–52.
80
DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS (1991).
81
Id. at 212.
82
Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 266
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of minimization that concerns us: (1) to “offer moral justifications or
psychological excuses” for the criminal conduct and (2) to “minimize the
moral seriousness of the offense.”83 Police offered moral justifications or
excuses in 34% of the interrogations, and minimized the crime’s moral
seriousness in 22%.84 Detectives use multiple tactics in any interrogation,
but we read these results to indicate that detectives minimized the crime’s
moral seriousness and/or offered moral justifications or excuses, such as
blame-shifting, in one third to one-half of interrogations.85
Second, consider a 2007 survey of law enforcement interrogators.86
Over six hundred law enforcement officers (574 members of sixteen U.S.
police departments plus 57 customs officials from two Canadian provinces)
answered questions on interrogation practices. The survey asked which of
sixteen tactics they employed using a five-point scale ranging from “never”
(1) to “always” (5).87 For the tactic “[o]ffering the suspect sympathy, moral
justifications and excuses,” the mean answer was 3.38, which falls between
“sometimes” (3) and “often” (4). Six percent answered this question by
saying they never used the tactic (1) and 13% by saying they always did

(1996) [hereinafter Interrogation Room] (reporting on 60 recorded interrogations from police
departments in two small cities and 122 contemporaneously observed interrogations at a
major urban police department).
83
Id. at 278 (table 5).
84
Id.
85
Subsequent observations report significantly different numbers, but confirm that
minimization is a real world tactic. In 2013, Barry Feld reported on his review of 307
delinquency files of sixteen and seventeen year olds charged with felonies in Minnesota, and
found that minimization was present in only 17% of interrogations. Barry C. Feld, Real
Interrogation: What Actually Happens When Cops Question Kids, 47 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1
(2013) (table 4). Most recently, Christopher Kelly and co-authors reviewed twenty-nine
interrogations (totaling forty-five hours) conducted by the Los Angeles Police Department
in homicide, rape, and robbery cases, and found that interrogators offered moral
rationalizations in 83% (24 of 29) of the interrogations. Christopher E. Kelly, et al., On the
Road (to Admission): Engaging Suspects with Minimization, 25 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L.
166, 171 (2019) (Table 1). (These researchers also coded the frequency of different
interrogation tactics by examining each interview in 5-minute segments. They found that
detectives offered rationalizations in 4.7% of the 5-minute intervals, making it the sixth most
frequently used tactic.) Id. at 172.
86
Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of
Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 385 (2007).
87
The other options for answering were 2 – rarely, 3 – sometimes, and 4 – often. Id. at
387.
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(5).88 For the tactic “[m]inimizing the moral seriousness of the offense,” the
mean response was 3.02, with 11% saying never and 8% saying always.89
Of the interrogation tactics that involve the substance of questions, these
two were the fifth and eighth most frequently employed tactics (where
investigators routinely employ multiple tactics in a given interrogation).90
The mean responses for these two tactics – within a range of “sometimes”
to “often” – are consistent with Leo’s study showing that the strategies were
employed in at least one-third of the cases.
A final source for confirming the use of minimization are the
judicial opinions discussing interrogations. Appellate opinions cannot give
us a reliable basis for estimating the frequency of station house
minimization. Not only are there the usual concerns that litigated appeals
may fail to represent cases not so litigated, but also note that moral
minimization is not usually relevant to the lawfulness of interrogation, so
defense lawyers have little reason to raise issues concerning its use.91
Nonetheless, the opinions do confirm as a matter of sworn testimony that
88

Id. at 388, Table 2.
Id.
90
Including all tactics, those described in the text were still among the top ten of most
frequently employed. Id. See also Allison D. Redlich, et al., The Who, What, and Why of
Human Intelligence Fathering: Self-Reported Measures of Interrogation Methods, 28
APPLIED COG. PSYCH. 817 (2014) (finding similar frequency results from a survey of 152
U.S. military and federal law enforcement about the use of “moral rationalizations” and
“minimization” (Table 1A, not reported in publication but shared by author Allison Redlich
and on file).
91
See, e.g., United States v. Jacques, 744 F.3d 804, 812 (1st Cir. 2014) (finding that
“statements . . . minimizing the gravity of Jacques’s offense . . . fall safely within the realm
of the permissible ‘chicanery’”). We have found three state cases in which courts suppressing
a confession recognized that minimization was one relevant factor in a totality of the
circumstances test for voluntariness. See Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516,
525 (Mass. 2004); State v. Baker, 465 P.3d 860, 873 (Haw. 2020); State v. Stone, 237 P.3d
1229, 1241–42 (Kan. 2010), all discussed infra note 121 and accompanying text. But those
cases involved many traditional circumstances supporting involuntariness and we find no
similar cases elsewhere.
Appellate courts typically avoid describing moral minimization even when it is present.
See, e.g., Schumaker v. Kirkpatrick, 808 F. App'x 47, 49 (2d Cir. 2020) (describing the
defendant’s claim that interrogators used “minimization[]” though without details). Even in
a case finding that false promises of leniency rendered a confession involuntary and
inadmissible, the court noted that the trial judge stated that the police interrogation
techniques had “includ[ed] minimization of the crime,” but “did not specifically describe the
‘interrogation techniques’ used.” State v. Hunt, 151 A.3d 911, 915 & n.1 (Me. 2016).
89
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the minimization tactics are a “fairly common” practice and confirm the
influence of the Reid technique.92 Moreover, these cases offer a glimpse
into the actual minimizing words the interrogators use.
Consider murder cases. In Minnesota, Kelly Ritt was accused of
purposely starting a fire to kill her twenty-three month old, special needs
daughter (but not her other three children, who survived).93 The detective
who interrogated Ritt energetically used the tactic when “he confided that
he too had a disabled child whose care was very demanding, that often he
wished he ‘could throw’ his son out the window, that sometimes he wanted
to see the child die rather than suffer, and that his own wife ‘could have
intentionally done this’ too.”94 In a Massachusetts case, the detectives
offered to a murder suspect “reasons why he might have killed the victim
[his mother] without being ‘a bad guy,’ including . . . the possibility that he
had been provoked by mistreatment from his mother or his aunt.”95 “The
officers acknowledged at trial that they had been trained in techniques
known as ‘minimization.’”96 In a recent Illinois case, “detectives used
minimization tactics and attempted to diminish the legal seriousness and
moral seriousness of” the defendant’s killing by remarking “that they, too,
would remember and seek vengeance on someone [like the victim,

92

In an Ohio case involving sexual misconduct with a minor, the detective agreed that
his effort to “minimize the extent of the crime” is a “fairly common police tactic.” State v.
Fouts, 2016-Ohio-1104, 2016 WL 1071457, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2016). See also
United States v. Woody, No. CR-13–08093–001-PCT, 2015 WL 1530552, at 10 (D. Ariz.
Apr. 6, 2015), rev'd, 652 F. App'x 519 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that an FBI agent “has received
training in the Reid technique” and the agent “acknowledged that he generally employs
minimization”).
93
See State v. Ritt, 599 N.W.2d 802 (1999).
94
See Coughlin, supra note 14 at 1649 (citing transcripts). Confirming that the appellate
courts have no doctrinal reason to describe moral minimization when it occurs, the appellate
opinion upholding Ritt’s conviction for murder does not mention these astonishing facts,
even though the interrogation was a major issue for the appeal. See State v. Ritt, 599 N.W.2d
802 (Minn. 1999). See also United States v. Hunter, 912 F. Supp.2d 388, 393 (E.D. Va. 2012)
(describing the detective in a child-murder case as telling suspect that “every parent had been
in the defendant’s position and that no one would ‘fault’ her”).
95
Commonwealth v. Cartright, 84 N.E.3d 851, 857 (Mass. 2017).
96
Id.
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purportedly] who murdered their brother.”97 Several other judicial opinions
in murder cases turn up examples of moral minimization.98
The police minimize the seriousness of sexual assault. In an Idaho
case, police suspected the adult defendant of inappropriately touching a
fifteen-year-old foster child at his residence, which would constitute a crime
punishable by up to fifteen years in prison.99 Yet the detective “repeatedly
and substantially downplayed the serious of the allegations,”100 saying: “So
[the girl] has made a few statements about some pretty minor issues, in the
big scheme of things. . . . This case is (inaudible) not even a blip on the
radar hardly because it’s not really major allegations. . . . [E]ven if those
things are true, they are just minor issues,” which might be handled that
same day, as by an apology letter.101 Later the detective said that the
accusations were “not the end of the world,” and that the greater crime
would be lying to the police.102 Several other reported sexual assault
interrogations have used a similar approach,103 especially when the suspect
is a juvenile.104
97

People v. Jones, No. 1–17–1623, 2021 WL 1227837, *13 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 31, 2021).
See Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 335 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Rovner, J.,
dissenting) (“The investigators in this case employed classic minimization techniques by”
blaming confederate); State v. Stone, 303 P.3d 636, 642 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013) (interrogator
stated “[T]his is not the crime of the century” and that being “a liar” is worse “by far”);
Commonwealth v. Harris, 11 N.E.3d 95, 103 n.6 (Mass. 2014) (interrogators stated “that
people get passionate . . . and ‘snap everyday of their lives’”); Dock v. State, No. 02–18–
00462-CR, 2019 WL 6205248, at *5 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2019) (“detectives’
interrogation followed [the] approach” of interrogation manuals “to minimize the moral
seriousness of the offense and to cast blame on the victim and society”).
99
State v. Valero, 285 P.3d 1014, 1015–16, 1018 (Idaho Ct. App.2012).
100
Id. at 1017.
101
Id. at 1017–19 (“[These allegations] are not like some major issue that you and I can’t
get resolved today.”).
102
Id. at 1018–19.
103
See State v. Chavez-Meza, 456 P.3d 322, 326 (Or. Ct. App. 2019) (reporting that in
a rape case involving a twelve-year-old victim, the detectives stated: “Like, we can deal with
mistakes. People make mistakes all the time, and you still live your life.”); People v. MoralesCuevas, 2018 WL 4501114, *9–10 (Ct. App. Cal. 2018) (interrogator used “minimization”
techniques regarding defendant’s sexual assaults on stepdaughter beginning when she was
nine years old); State v. Stone, 237 P.3d 1229, 1241–42 (Kan. 2010) (interrogators
minimized crime with nine-year old victim by stating: “I mean, she's not saying that you had
sex with her but that you just had her, just basically just jack you off. And that's, you know,
that's not a big deal.”).
104
In a California case, In re Elias V, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 202, 215–16 (Cal. Ct. App.
98
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Rhode Island state police used similar tactics in a child pornography
case, where the detective stated that “downloading of child pornography
was ‘not the end of the world’ . . . [and] that things can be thought of as ‘a
spectrum, with the monster at one side ... good old American porn [on the
other end] ... [a]nd then right next to that, is like the stuff you're looking at,
inappropriate CP, we call it, Child Porn.’105 The Court found these
statements were “clearly based on the Reid Technique”106
The sexual assault cases also illustrate the tactic of redirecting blame
to other factors, such as alcohol and genetics, and of blaming the victim.
From a recent sexual assault case from Hawaii, where the victims were
minors, here a sample of the detective’s monologue:
[Y]ou just made an error in judgment. . . . You were just not
in the right frame of mind . . . Alcohol is . . . where people
get themselves into trouble, cause they lose their
inhibitions[.] . . . Women are a lot more promiscuous, you
know. . . Everybody fucks up in life, okay . . . [O]ur brains
are programmed a certain way . . . . Guys are programmed to
procreate. . . . We all get busted. This is how our brains are
wired. . . You just drank too much, dude. You drank too
much. You smoked too much. Bad error in judgment.107
2015), the court described how the detective, interrogating a 13-year old boy, employed
“minimization” by offering him two “understandable” explanations for the sexual touching
of a three-year old: “natural ‘curiosity,’” or “that the act was one any normal person in his
shoes would find ‘exciting.’” Id. at 216. See also Commonwealth v. Bell, 365 S.W.3d 216,
219–220 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (interrogating detective said to the thirteen year old suspect of
sexual assault of six-year old cousin “that thirteen-year-old boys ‘have a lot of hormones,’”
and that “you did it because you were horny, had a hard on, and you were curious.”); In re
A.W., No. A-0244–09T2, 2011 WL 386999, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 3, 2011),
aff'd sub nom. State ex rel. A.W., 51 A.3d 793 (N.J. 2012) (interrogator provided juvenile
suspect of the sexual assault of a child the excuse of “experimentation”); In re Welfare of J.
M. B., No. C5–00–144, 2000 WL 890401, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. July 3, 2000) (noting that
the “detective told J.M.B. that if any sexual contact occurred, it was not a big deal, it was
“normal experience stuff,” during interrogation of juvenile for the sexual abuse of a threeyear old).
105
United States v. Monroe, 264 F.Supp.3d 376, 391 n.143 (D.R.I. 2017).
106
Id.
107
State v. Baker, 465 P.3d 860, 864 (Haw. 2020).
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Minimization of statutory rape crimes includes the ideas that
children can initiate and consent to sex and that some minors are
particularly mature and attractive. In one California case, the adult male
defendant was convicted of sexual assault crimes involving a girl A.C.
whom he began molesting when she was ten years old and with whom he
had anal sex when she was thirteen years old.108 The interrogating
detectives suggested to Gomez that
A.C. was mature for her age, was fully developed with large
breasts, and probably ‘came on’ to defendant. . . . [Detective]
Skrinde said he and [Detective] Garcia were starting to
wonder if it was more A.C. than defendant, suggesting A.C.
was a beautiful, fully developed woman who may have been
attracted to defendant . . . Skrinde said to defendant, ‘You're
a man. And that I get. It's happened to me.’109
Many other cases use the same minimizations along with alcohol
consumption to rationalize underage sex crimes.110
Consider further the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. No state
holds that moral minimization alone can render a confession involuntary,
but Massachusetts is one of the few American jurisdictions to recognize that
108

See Gomez v. California, No. 1:18-cv-00642-DAD-SAB-HC, 2019 WL 358631, at
*1, 2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2019).
109
Id. at *11 (emphasis added). See also Couglin, supra note 14 (explaining how later
editions of INBAU, ET AL, deleted the suggestion from earlier editions that the detective
minimize a sex crime by claiming to have committed a similar one in his youth).
110
See People v. Aguirre, No. H041415, 2016 WL 3679901, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. July
6, 2016) (interrogator said victim under 14 was “very attractive” and “probably came on
to” suspect); People v. Cortez, 2016 WL 6962539, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2016)
(interrogator “referenced” the “physical appearance and conduct” of the victim, under age
14, and “suggested she was also guilty.”); State v. Chavez-Meza, 456 P.3d 322, 324, 327
(Or. Ct. App. 2019) (interrogator said of twelve year old victim, “I believe that it was
probably consensual, she wanted to have set with you”); State v. Fernandez-Torres, 337
P.3d 691, 695 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014) (interrogator excused inappropriately touching a
seven-year old girl because suspect “had too much to drink,” and “it's ok because you
didn't keep on touching her.”); Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, No. 2009–00639, 2011 WL
649942, at *7 (Mass. Super. Feb. 14, 2011) (offering the suspect in the sexual assault of
two children the excuse: “[W]e know it's not you it's the booze”).
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minimization is a relevant factor within the “totality of circumstances” that
determines the voluntariness, and thus admissibility, of a confession.111
That legal stance explains why there are more cases from this state –
defense lawyers have at least a weak reason to litigate moral minimizations.
In one Massachusetts robbery case, detectives offered the defendant reasons
for why he may have committed the alleged robberies, such as needing
money to buy food for himself and his infant daughter.112 A Massachusetts
arson case describes a detective’s minimization in “an hour-long near
monologue,” comparing “his view of the defendant's conduct to the sort of
mischief, pranking and “tomfoolery” that could take place on ‘cabbage
night,’” referring to “the night before Halloween,” and also offering alcohol
as an excuse.113
In another Massachusetts arson case, the court recognized the
“standard interrogation tactic of ‘minimization’” and its origin in the
Inbau/Reid interrogation manual.114 The defendant had a dispute with his
landlord over the latter’s failure to make repairs to the apartment, which
presented an opportunity to blame the victim.115 According to the court, the
trooper “downplay[ed] the crime itself” “by pointing out that . . . in light of
the deplorable condition of the premises, the trooper could ‘relate to’ and
‘understand’ his anger at the landlord and the desire to ‘do something like
that.’”116

111

See Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 525 (Mass. 2004). The court
has not found that moral minimization alone could render a confession involuntary. See also
State v. Baker, 465 P.3d 860, 873 (Haw. 2020) (finding that moral minimization statements
and gender-based stereotypes were two of seven factors that made the defendant’s confession
involuntary); State v. Stone, 237 P.3d 1229, 1241–42 (Kan. 2010) (finding that minimizing
sexual assault of a nine-year old as “not a big deal” and not really “sex” was one factor of
many in finding confession involuntary).
112
Commonwealth v. Monroe, 35 N.E.3d 677, 686 (Mass. 2015). See also
Commonwealth. v. Quint Q., 84 Mass. App. Ct. 507, 511 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (interrogator
of a 15-year old suspected of breaking and entering said: “maybe what you did . . . [was] a
momentary lapse of judgment; you made a mistake”).
113
Commonwealth v. Baye, 967 N.E.2d 1120, 1124 (Mass. 2012).
114
Id. at 527.
115
Id. at 519.
116
Id. at 520.
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In sum, law enforcement surveys, direct observations, and judicial
opinions all make clear that American police frequently employ the
interrogation tactic of moral minimization.
D. A Very Rough Estimate of the Frequency of Moral Minimizations
Consider a “back of the envelope” estimate for the number of moral
minimizations in the United States in one year. In 2019, state and local law
enforcement made over ten million arrests.117 If we narrow our focus to
likely felonies of the sort discussed above, then the relevant subset contains
1.5 million arrests for violent and property crimes.118 The violent crimes are
murder, non-negligent homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault; the
property crimes are burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and
arson.119 FBI Uniform Crime Reports do not separate felony and
misdemeanor arrests, but these crimes are nearly always classified as
felonies. The number is a conservative estimate considering we are leaving
out arrests for non-aggravated assaults and other relevant crimes that are
sometimes felonies (and also because the police sometimes interrogate
suspects they never arrest). The limited available evidence suggests that,
post-Miranda, police manage to interrogate arrestees in about 80% of
felonies.120 This figure implies that police manage to deploy some
interrogation tactics on about 1.2 million felony suspects per year.
Using the Leo observations from before, under which the
conservative estimate is that police use the tactic in one-third of
117

Criminal Justice Information Services Division, FBI, 2019 Crime in the United
States, FBI: UCR (last visited Jan. 21, 2022), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/topic-pages/persons-arrested (estimating 2019 arrests at
10,085,207).
118
Id. (estimating 495,871 violent crime arrests and 1,074,367 property crime arrests).
119
Id. at Table 29, n.3.
120
See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An
Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 854, 869 (1996) (reporting
on a sample of 219 felony arrestees in Salt Lake City in which police failed to question 21%
of felony suspects); FLOYD FEENEY, ET AL., ARRESTS WITHOUT CONVICTION: HOW OFTEN
THEY OCCUR AND WHY 13 (1983) (table 15–2) (reporting that police failed to question
18.5% of burglary arrestees in Jacksonville, Florida and 20.1% of burglary arrestees in San
Diego); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOL. 621,
654 (1998) (finding that 78% of a suspects in a sample waive their Miranda rights).
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interrogations, we arrive at an estimated 400,000 times a year that police
detectives minimize the moral seriousness of the suspected offense and/or
shift moral blame away from the suspect. One could work to make the
estimates better at each stage, but the exact number is not of great concern
for our purposes. The phenomenon would be significant even if it we were
overestimating it by an order of magnitude.
We also note a final reason to think the number 400,000 understates
the significance of the practice. There is no perfect acoustic separation121
between the interrogation room and the rest of the world. Suspects no doubt
recount what the police said to them to others. Although some of those who
receive these reports from interrogated suspects might not believe them,
others no doubt do. If interrogated suspects credibly conveyed the
interrogator’s statements to a little more than, one average, one close friend
or relative, then our best guess is that more than a million Americans
receive a message each year that law enforcement authorities regard some
serious crime as trivial and/or that society or the victim is to blame. As
indicated, this remains a very rough guess.
II. THE CRIMINOGENIC RISKS OF MORAL MINIMIZATION
This Part develops our claim that the ubiquitous practice of moral
minimization marginally increases crime. Section A identifies the one
plausible theory by which moral minimization works, i.e., how it could
increase true confessions (more than it increases false confessions). The
Reid manual identifies the psychological theory as that of neutralization, as
we explain. Section B then explores legal and/or social science literatures
that reveal the criminogenic risks of moral minimization, beginning with
neutralization and continuing with research on moral disengagement, the
concept of the marginal offender, restorative justice, the doctrine of the
entrapment defense, legal legitimacy, and the connection between informal
social norms and law’s expressive effects. Section C synthesizes the
argument by identifying particular crimes and particular defendants for
which the criminogenic claim is most -- and least -- powerful. Section D
defends the claim against an objection to our thesis, the idea that criminal
121

Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. LAW REV. 625 (1984).
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prosecution, conviction, and punishment contain enough expressive
condemnation of the perpetrator’s crime to undo all the damage of moral
minimization.
A. Why Might Moral Minimization Increase Confessions?
American police are committed to using moral minimization in
interrogation. Is that because the tactic increases confessions, or more
importantly, because the tactic increases true confessions more than it
increases false confessions?
One possible answer is no, the widespread use of the tactic does not
promote true confessions, but is simply a misguided practice. Interrogation
is more art than science and, as with other discredited domains of intuitionbased policing, sometimes the conventional wisdom is false.122 There is no
rigorous empirical testing that demonstrates the causal contribution of moral
minimization to the success of interrogations. Part of the testing problem is
general: there is no evidence that the overall style of accusatory
interrogation, such as the Reid Technique, is better than the overall nonaccusatory styles, such as the information gathering techniques used in the
United Kingdom, Australia, and other places.123 But even if we did know
122

See, e.g., Erin Blakemore, FBI Admits Pseudoscientific Hair Analysis Used in
Hundreds of Cases, SMITHSONIAN MAG., April 22, 2015 (reporting on forensic scandal
about the nature of hair analysis); Daniel T. O'Brien, Chelsea Farrell, & Brandon C. Welsh,
Looking Through Broken Windows: The Impact of Neighborhood Disorder on Aggression
and Fear of Crime Is an Artifact of Research Design, 2 ANN. REV. CRIMINOL. 53 (2019)
(reporting on meta-analysis finding no support for claim that disorder contributes to crime,
the assumption of many policing strategies).
123
See Meissner et al., supra note 18, at 216. There is no rich field data to allow such a
comparison between real world interrogators who use different methods, much less do we
have a randomized trial comparing different methods. See, e.g., Peter Kageleiry, Jr.,
Psychological Police Interrogation Methods: Pseudoscience in the Interrogation Room
Obscures Justice in the Courtroom, 193 MIL. L. REV. 1 (2007). Experimental results
tentatively suggest that the information-gathering method is superior to accusatory methods.
See Christian A. Meissner, et al., Accusatorial and Information-Gathering Interrogation
Methods and Their Effects on True and False Confessions: a Meta-Analytic Review, 10 J.
EXP. CRIMINOL. 459, 460 (2014) (finding field studies lack the ability to measure false
confessions, but twelve experiments suggest the superior diagnosticity of informationgathering over accusatory methods). See also Jacqueline R. Evans, et al., Obtaining Guilty
Knowledge in Human Intelligence Interrogations: Comparing Accusatorial and
Information-Gathering Approaches with a Novel Experimental Paradigm, 2 J. APPLIED
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that accusatory methods were more effective overall than the alternatives at
inducing true confessions and avoiding false ones, there is no evidence that
the particular tactic of moral minimization is important to the success of the
overall technique.124 In short, perhaps the reality is that moral minimization
does not work, and it is a mistaken tradition.
RSCH. MEMORY & COGNITION 83, 86–87 (2013) (reporting experimental results showing the
superiority of information-gathering over accusatory methods in an intelligence setting).
124
There are no randomized trials of different interrogation techniques, nor rich data
allowing comparison of interrogators using the Reid techniques to those using all the
techniques except moral minimization. Leo found higher confession rates in interrogations
with certain moral minimizations than without. Leo, Interrogation Room, supra note 82, at
294 (reporting in Table 14 the success rate with the tactic of “moral justifications/
psychological excuses”); id at 295–96 (reporting in Table 15 the success of “offer[ing] moral
rationalizations”). In each case, the chi-squared test showed significance at the level of p <
.05. Id. Leo does not assert that this correlation shows the success of the technique, but one
paper later cited Leo as evidence that the tactic is “highly effective.” Copes, et al., supra note
36, at 448, 450. But this is not a sound inference. Leo had no way to discern whether
confessions were true or false, and therefore no way to judge the tactic a net success. Nor did
he compare the accusatory style of interrogation with a competitor, such as informationgathering or the improvisations of an untrained interrogator. Moreover, one cannot make
reliable causal inferences from the data because Leo was not controlling for a host of relevant
variables, such as the experience of the detective or length of the interrogation. Among
possible confounds, Leo, Interrogation Room, supra note 82, at 297, reports that longer
interrogations are more successful, and that police had longer interrogations when the victim
was female, id., which is precisely when we might expect police to be more likely to
minimize by blaming the victim. If so, it could be that the tactic’s correlation with
confessions is due to interrogation length rather than the moral minimization that is merely
correlated with length.
A recent interrogation study measures a variable Leo lacks – the frequency by which
detectives use techniques in actual interrogations, as well as temporally connected selfincriminating statements. The results are mixed, finding that offering moral rationalizations
was not significantly associated with admissions, but rationalizations do significantly
increase crying by the suspect, which significantly increases the odds of a suspect admission.
Kelly, et al., supra note 85, at 173 (reporting on results from 45 hours of 29 felony
interrogations by Los Angeles Police Department detectives). The experimenters had some
reason to think that all the suspects were guilty, but could not be certain, which means the
study offers no way to assess how the tactic affected the false confession rate.
Several experiments cast doubt on the net effectiveness of minimization. Their
design involved the interrogation of participants who had actually violated some rules of the
experiment. See, e.g., Melissa B. Russano, et al., Investigating True and False Confessions
Within a Novel Experimental Paradigm, 16 PSYCH. SCI. 481 (2005). The experiment allowed
measurement of true and false confessions and true and false non-confessions, in response
to changes in interrogation tactics. Moral minimization increased confessions among the
guilty, but increased confessions by the innocent to a greater extent. Thus, minimization
lowered the overall diagnosticity of the interrogation. See id. at 484 (table 1). Reaching
similar results, see Jessica R. Klaver, et al., Effects of Personality, Interrogation Techniques
and Plausibility in an Experimental False Confession Paradigm, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOL.
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If the tactic fails, then it would be far better for American police to
abandon it. American governments currently spend money training
detectives on interrogation methods. American detectives currently spend
scarce interrogation time spinning out themes of minimization. Another cost
occurs whenever the victim-blaming tactic leaks out into the world and
victims suffer the anguish of learning that detectives told the offender that
the victim was to blame for the crime. Whatever their magnitude, there is no
reason to bear any of these costs if the tactic does not work.
We will nonetheless assume for the sake of argument the other
possibility, that accusatory methods like the Reid technique are more
effective than the alternatives at inducing true confessions and avoiding
false ones, and that the tactic of moral minimization is an important
contributor to its success. Although not empirically verified, there are two
plausible mechanisms for success, two reasons it might increase true
confessions.
One possible theory is that moral minimization convinces suspects
that prosecutors and judges will treat them with lenience in charging and
sentencing. But the manual strictly avoids offering this rationale because it
explicitly warns interrogators of the legal risks of making promises of
leniency in exchange for a confession.125 Of course, prosecutors can
negotiate with defense lawyers for a confession and guilty plea, but state
and federal courts view police promises of official leniency, made to
PSYCH. 71 (2008); Fadia M. Narchet, et al., Modeling the Influence of Investigator Bias on
the Elicitation of True and False Confessions, 35 L. HUM. BEHAV. 452 (2011); Allyson J.
Horgan, et al., Minimization and Maximization Techniques: Assessing the Perceived
Consequences of Confessing and Confession Diagnosticity, 18 PSYCH. CRIME & L. 65
(2012). Experiments that do not involve actual criminality nor real detectives raise obvious
external validity concerns. There is also the possibility that false confessions in the real world
might be identified as such before trial, so they may matter less for assessing ultimate
diagnosticity. See Christopher Slobogin, Manipulation of Suspects and Unrecorded
Questioning: After Fifty Years of Miranda Jurisprudence, Still Two (or Maybe Three)
Burning Issues, 97 B.U. LAW REV. 1157, 1163–64 (2017). Because of these uncertainties,
our claim is merely that the effectiveness of moral minimization remains plausible but
empirically unproven.
125
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 203, 425; JAYNE & BUCKLEY, FIELD GUIDE, supra note
20, at 276.
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unrepresented suspects in interrogation, as undermining the voluntariness
and reliability of a confession.126 The social science scholarship on false
confessions supports the concern that American interrogation tactics
generally cause false confessions127 and specifically do so, in part, because
minimization promises official leniency “by implication.”128 If this
implication of official lenience were the very mechanism by which moral
minimization increases confessions, then courts should insist that American
police abandon the practice.
Which leads us to the third and final possibility, the only plausible
mechanism by which moral minimization uniquely produces desirable
confessions: by making it seem likely that people other than the prosecutor
and judge will be sympathetic. When detectives minimize the moral
wrongfulness of a crime, they make it appear, at a minimum, that the
detectives will be more “sympathetic and forgiving” of the confessed
perpetrator. The detectives’ attitude also implies that the broader society
126

Federal courts have been wary of such promises for more than a century. See, e.g.,
Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 622 (1896) (stating that confessions are “inadmissible
if made under any . . . promise, or encouragement of any hope or favor”); Bram v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (quoting with approval from a treatise: “But a confession, in
order to be admissible, must be free and voluntary; that is, must not be extracted by any sort
of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight.”).
Modern courts evaluate whether a promise of leniency renders a confession involuntary and
exclude involuntary confessions. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 437 F3d 1059, 1066 (10th
Cir. 2006) (upholding exclusion of confession for involuntariness because of police promise
of sentencing lenience); Squire v. State, 193 So.3d 105, 108 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 2016)
(agreeing “that the detective's comments created an implied promise of leniency,” such that
“the confession was induced by impermissible conduct”); State v. Rezk, 840 A.2d 758, 765
(N.H. 2004) (holding that “defendant's confessions were induced by specific promises of
leniency and were involuntary”). See also Michael J.Z. Mannheimer, Fraudulently Induced
Confessions, 96 NOTRE DAME LAW REV. 799, 818 (2020) (“Another ploy courts regularly
hold impermissible is making false promises of leniency, nonprosecution, immunity, or the
like in exchange for a confession.”).
127
See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin, et al., On the General Acceptance of Confessions Research:
Opinions of the Scientific Community, 73 AMER. PSYCHOLOGIST 63 (2018) (reporting on
survey of 87 experts on the psychology of confessions to identify scientific consensus,
including on the causes of false confessions); Brent Snook, et al., Urgent Issues and
Prospects in Reforming Interrogation Practices in the United States and Canada, 26 LEGAL
& CRIMINOL. PSYCH. 1, 10–11 (2021) (discussing what each of 11 authors views as the
critical research and reform issues in the psychology of interrogation).
128
See Saul M. Kassin & Karlyn McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions:
Communicating Promises and Threats by Pragmatic Implication, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 233,
239 (1991); Snook et al., supra note 127, at 14–15.
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will be less disapproving of the confessed perpetrator. These implications
reduce the expected shame or stigma from confessing, rendering a
confession more likely. On this view, moral minimization does not imply
official leniency in sentencing, but instead reduces the anxiety the suspect
will experience from admitting the crime to the detectives and, later, to
family, friends, and acquaintances.
Yet to understand this psychological mechanism precisely is to
understand its danger. Expected psychological costs work to prevent future
criminal behavior. The government’s persistent effort to trivialize crime and
cast blame away from the offender undermines multiple internal and
informal mechanisms of legal compliance, as we explore in this Part. The
risk is that moral minimization increases recidivism.
To be clear, these costs of moral minimization stand on similar
empirical footing as the purported benefits of the tactic (their tendency to
produce true confessions). Neither is empirically validated; both are merely
plausible. But our thesis in this article is that the criminogenic risks are as
plausible as the claim that the interrogation tactic is effective at inducing
true confessions. As we show, the same psychological processes –
especially neutralization – that arguably lead to confessions also makes it
more likely that the interrogated suspect will offend in the future. We also
identify mechanisms other than neutralization – social norms and legal
legitimacy – that link moral minimization to increased crime. In that sense,
our criminogenic claim is more plausible than the effectiveness of moral
minimization because the latter strictly depends on neutralization theory
while the former does not.
B. The Risks of Minimizing Internal Motives for Compliance
1.

Neutralization Theory

The manual emphasizes that the goal is to reinforce the same
neutralizations that actually motivated the suspect to commit the crime.129
129
See INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 210 (advocating “a persuasive effort on the part
of the investigator to reinforce those existing excuses or rationalizations within the guilty
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For what reason? To justify minimization, the Reid manual points to the
psychological theory of neutralization, initially proposed in the 1950s.130
Neutralization is not an all-purpose theory of crime, but a resolution of a
particular puzzle that arises for some people and some crimes. The puzzle
is: How can people who have internalized a norm against certain criminal
conduct, such as against stealing or violence, nonetheless engage in the
conduct? Or, to put it differently, should we always disbelieve those who
intentionally commit a crime when they subsequently claim to feel remorse
and suffer guilt? On a simplistic account, those who have internalized the
norm against the criminal act of violence or theft would not commit such
crimes, so those who commit those crimes show themselves not to have
internalized the norms. Their expressed remorse would not be genuine.
The better view, however, is that those who internalize the norm can
still intentionally violate it, and then feel guilt and remorse. One possibility
is that the internal motive for avoiding crime usually leads to legal
compliance, but in some instances the expected benefit from the crime is so
high as to overcome the expected feeling of guilt. Another explanation,
complimentary to the first, is that the individuals managed to neutralize
their internal commitments. Consider this recent description, which focuses
on the delinquency of minors:
When people are committed to a particular value system,
they typically experience guilt or shame for violating, or
even contemplating violating, its norms. This guilt, and its
potential for producing a negative self-image, dissuades most
people from engaging in crime or delinquency. Therefore, to
participate in delinquent behavior under such conditions,
suspect’s mind”); at 207 (“If the investigator’s suggested moral or psychological
justifications are not already present in the suspect’s mind, the suspect will often reject the
implications of the theme.”); at 202 (noting that the detective aims to “reinforce the guilty
suspect’s own rationalizations and justifications for committing the crime”) (emphasis
added); Jayne & Buckley, FIELD GUIDE, supra note 20, at 276 (recommending that the
interrogator “reinforce the defense mechanisms that already exist in the suspect’s mind.”).
The main alternative to the Reid Technique suggests the same. See ZULAWSKI &
WICKLANDER, supra note 37, at 308 (“The motive behind the incident will often lead the
interrogator to the proper rationalization.”).
130
See INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 325–26, nn.7 & 15. See also infra note 133.
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youths must find ways to neutralize the guilt associated with
their actions. They do this by relying on patterned thoughts
and beliefs that blunt the moral force of the law and
neutralize the guilt of criminal participation. . . . allowing
individuals to engage freely in delinquency without serious
damage to their self-image.131
Neutralization theory thus explains one necessary causal step for a certain
group of people – those who have internalized social norms some criminal
provisions enforce – to violate those particular criminal provisions.
Stated more briefly: The criminal “distorts what was done and the
motives for doing it until the behavior is consistent with self-concept.”132
The primary Reid manual quotes this explanation of neutralization theory
by psychologist Michael Lillyquist as part of its general effort to explain
why moral minimization works to elicit confessions.133 The idea is that the
suspect expects to experience psychological costs, e.g., anxiety and shame,
from confessing. Moral minimization lowers those costs. First, the tactic
demonstrates that the detectives themselves will not make critical
judgments of the suspect. As noted in a psychological appendix to the third
edition of the primary manual: “The mere embarrassment of having to
admit an act of wrongdoing can pose a formidable barrier to overcome
during an interrogation.”134 Second, the suspect makes inferences from the
detectives’ minimizations. “[I]f the suspect who is concerned about
avoiding personal consequences believes that the interrogator can
131

Robert G. Morris & Heith Copes, Exploring the Temporal Dynamics of the
Neutralization/ Delinquency Relationship, 37 CRIM JUST. REV. 442, 443 (2012).
132
See INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 326, n.15 (quoting. LILLYQUIST, supra note 36, at
152.
133
See INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 325–26, n.7 (citing LILLYQUIST, supra note 36, at
153–60 and Copes, et al., supra note 36. The third edition of the manual, INBAU ET AL,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 327–47 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter, INBAU, ET
AL., THIRD EDITION] contained an Appendix titled “The Psychological Principles of Criminal
Interrogation,” written by Brian C. Jayne. That appendix, Id. at 340–41 nn.1 & 2, also
explains how offenders rationalize their crimes by citing Lillyquist, as well as the seminal
article on neutralization, Gresham M. Sykes & David Matza, Techniques of Neutralization:
A Theory of Delinquency, 22 AM. SOCIO. REV. 664, 667–69 (1957).
134
INBAU, ET. AL, THIRD EDITION, supra note 133, at 328 (from the appendix titled “The
Psychological Principles of Criminal Interrogation,” by Brian C. Jayne).
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understand and seem to forgive the offense or suspect, he may believe that
others will also be sympathetic and forgiving.”135
Yet the cited pages of the Lillyquist book are a clear warning to
those who would minimize crimes or criminal responsibility. Neutralization
theory implies that the easier it is for an individual to neutralize the moral
objections to a crime, the easier it is for the individual to commit the crime.
Although there are many causes of crime, Lillyquist states (on the same
page from which the Reid manual quotes): “It is often the case that the
words which a person offers after an event, as a rationalization, were
available to the person before the event, and, furthermore, that were they
not available, the person may not have committed an action inconsistent
with his or her self-concept.”136 Lillyquist also quotes the sociologist C.
Wright Mills: “Often anticipation of acceptable justifications will control
conduct. (‘If I did this, what could I say? What would they say?’) Decisions
may be, wholly or in part, delimited by answers to such queries.”137 In other
word, the claim being made on the very pages the Reid manual cites, is that,
at the margin, neutralizations cause crime. The causal claim is made
throughout the cited chapter.138
As should now be apparent, there is no difference between what the
Reid manuals call “theme-development,” what we call “moral
minimization,” and what this psychological literature calls “neutralization.”

Id. at 341. By “personal consequences,” the psychological appendix refers to effects
on the “individual’s self-concept,” such as “loss of self-esteem, pride, or integrity.” Id. at
328. See also Id. at 343 (“[t]he interrogator must be careful in his condemnations; the suspect
should experience anxiety not because of the crime committed, but rather because he is lying
about it.”).
136
LILLYQUIST, supra note 36, at 152–53 (emphasis in original).
137
Id. (quoting C. WRIGHT MILLS, POWER, POLITICS, AND PEOPLE 443 (1963)).
138
See LILLYQUIST, supra note 36, at 160, where Lillyquist asks and answers the causal
question: “Are the neutralizations 'mere' rationalizations or do they operate before the offense
and facilitate it? . . . [T]he theorists who use the term neutralization intend it to be viewed as
a pre-offense activity, not just an excuse mustered after being caught.” He quotes a trio of
sociologists for the proposition that neutralizations are “not merely ex post facto excuses or
rationalizations invented for the authorities' ears, but rather phrases which actually facilitate
or motivate the commission of deviant actions by neutralizing a preexisting normative
constraint.” See id. (citing IAN TAYLOR, PAUL WALTON & JOCK YOUNG, THE NEW
CRIMINOLOGY: FOR A SOCIAL THEORY OF DEVIANCE 176 (1973)).
135
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On pages cited by the Reid manual, Lillyquist lists the classic “techniques
of neutralization” (taken from the seminal article on the subject139): (1)
denial of responsibility, (2) denial of injury, (3) denial of victim, (4)
condemnation of the condemnors, and (5) appeal to higher loyalties.”140 As
the manual indicates, these five neutralization techniques supply the Reid
themes of moral minimizations.
The first category, “Denial of responsibility” includes claims that
one was “intoxicated with liquor or drugs,”141 which, as we saw, is a
common interrogation tool.142 It also includes “tak[ing] the approach of the
extreme environmental attributionist who sees all actions as completely
determined by situational factors.”143 Interrogators use this technique when
they blame society or an emotional state.144 “Denial of injury” involves
adopting a narrow view of harm and describing some criminal acts as mere
“mischief” or “pranks.”145 We saw this narrowing in child sexual abuse
cases where detectives suggested that minors could and did consent to sex,
and in a Massachusetts case comparing arson to “cabbage night” pranks.146
“Denial of victim” includes the idea that “they had it coming.”147 We saw
many such victim-blaming techniques.
139

Sykes & Matza, supra note 133, at 667–69. See also W. William Minor, Techniques
of Neutralization: A Reconceptualization and Empirical Examination, 18 J. RSCH. CRIME &
DELINQ. 295 (1981).
140
LILLYQUIST, supra note 36, at 153 (citing Sykes & Matza, supra note 133. See id. at
667 (“It is by learning these techniques [of neutralization] that the juvenile becomes
delinquent.”). Neutralization theory is “no longer confined to the study of juvenile
delinquents,” but is applied to a wide variety of adult criminal behaviors. See Shadd Maruna
& Heith Copes, What Have We Learned from Five Decades of Neutralization Research?, 32
CRIME & JUST. 221, 223 (2005).
141
LILLYQUIST, supra note 36, at 153.
142
See supra notes 52, 63, 107, 115 and accompanying text.
143
LILLYQUIST, supra note 36, at 153. See also Sykes & Matza, supra note 133, at 667
(“In effect, the delinquent approaches a ‘billiard ball’ conception of himself in which he sees
himself as helplessly propelled into new situations.”).
144
See supra notes 21–23, 113, and accompanying text. Recall the sexual assault case
in which the interrogator had offered that the suspect acted when he was “not in the right
frame of mind.” State v. Baker, 465 P.3d 860, 864 (Haw. 2020).
145
See Sykes & Matza, supra note 133, at 667–68. See also LILLYQUIST, supra note 36,
at 154.
146
See supra note 126–32, 137, and accompanying text.
147
LILLYQUIST, supra note 36, at 154. See Sykes & Matza, supra note 133, at 668 (“The
injury . . . is a form of rightful retaliation or punishment”).
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The neutralization technique of “condemning the condemnor” posits
that everyone commits similar crimes or is corrupt, so the prosecution is
hypocritical.148 The Reid method specifically proposes to tell those
suspected of stealing from their employer how surprisingly common such
crime is, and to blame the government for “squeez[ing] citizens with
burdensome taxes . . . to waste on foreign countries.”149 Finally, the “higher
loyalties” technique justifies the crime as serving values more important
than law, such as the protection and welfare of one’s family or friends.150
Several Reid minimization themes involve proposing that the suspect acted
on behalf of his family.151
Given the overlap, our claim is simple. First, there is a theory that
proposes that people who have internalized social norms against criminal
acts are able to talk themselves into committing such acts only if they
succeed at “neutralization.” Second, there is an interrogation technique that
explicitly seeks to reinforce the suspect’s precise neutralizations. Thus, to
secure a confession for a past crime, moral minimization endorses and
encourages the very psychological processes that the referenced theory says
will lead to criminality. The technique is not a fleeting moment of the
interrogation, but a persistent theme requiring an extended monologue. And
the theme is memorable and powerful because it is presented with apparent
empathy by police officers from whom the suspect expected only
disapproval.
2.

Moral Disengagement Theory

Bolstering neutralization theory is the related idea of moral
disengagement. This social cognitive theory identifies the mechanisms by
which ordinary people who want to continue thinking of themselves as
decent and moral come to rationalize their bad conduct.152 Moral
148

Id. at 156; Sykes & Matza, supra note 133, at 668.
INBAU, ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 27, at 230.
150
LILLYQUIST, supra note 36, at 156–57; Sykes & Matza, supra note 133, at 669.
151
See INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 60.
152
See generally ALBERT BANDURA, MORAL DISENGAGEMENT: HOW PEOPLE DO HARM
AND LIVE WITH THEMSELVES (2016).
149
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disengagement is broader than neutralization because it focuses not only on
crimes, but also on legal but morally dubious activities. For example, how
do manufacturers of deadly commodities like cigarettes come to terms with
selling them, especially to minors, and with making agricultural and
chemical changes to increase their addictive properties?153 The
psychological mechanisms of disengagement includes some techniques
familiar from neutralization theory: diffusion of responsibility to others,
denial of the harm, appeals to honorable purposes, and dehumanizing the
victim.154 Another disengagement mechanism is the use of euphemistic
language that diverts attention away from the moral wrong.155
As with neutralization, moral disengagement is incremental. The
first instance of moral disengagement “will not instantly transform
considerate individuals into cruel ones.”156 Instead, individuals initially
“perform mildly harmful acts they can tolerate with some twinges of guilt,”
and then “[a]fter their self-reproof has been diminished through repeated
enactments, the level of ruthlessness increases until eventually acts they
originally regarded as abhorrent can be performed with little anguish or
self-censure.”157
Legal scholars have started to pay attention to moral disengagement
and related psychological ideas.158 That people are internally motivated to
maintain a positive self-image –including as being honest and moral – is
potentially good news for legal compliance. But that people have the
capacity for rationalization to avoid experiencing a loss of self-image, even
when acting badly, is bad news. Yuval Feldman’s book on the subject is

153

Id. at 239–51.
Id. at 62–64 (discussing diffusion of responsibility); 64–69 (discussing distortion and
denial of harmful effects); 49–53 (discussing moral and social justifications); 84–91
(discussing dehumanization and attribution of blame).
155
Id. at 53–56.
156
Id. at 97.
157
Id. at 97–98.
158
See Janice Nadler, Ordinary People and the Rationalization of Wrongdoing, 118
MICH. LAW REV. 1205, 1206 (2020) (“[T]he emerging field of Behavioral Ethics . . .
demonstrates . . . that wrongdoing is remarkably easy to provoke, in part because people
fail to fully recognize the ethical implications of their actions”).
154
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entitled The Law of Good People159 to emphasize the problem that law
usually faces is not the need to constrain the Holmesian “bad man”160
without moral scruples, but to regulate “good” people who will obey the
law unless they are able to succeed at rationalization.
Much of Feldman’s book aims to show how law might be structured
to impede the mechanisms of moral disengagement, so as to improve legal
compliance.161 Some of the recommendations involve subtle changes in
legal language.162 In this article, we add one simple recommendation: do not
have agents of the state endorse and reinforce the mechanisms of moral
disengagement. If a major problem of legal compliance is that wellmotivated people disengage from the moral wrongness of their acts by
denying that they caused harm, diffusing their personal responsibility, and
dehumanizing the victim, then it is risky to have detectives in interrogation
insist that a suspect’s theft or assault did no real harm, was justified by
higher moral considerations, and is really the fault of others, including the
victim. Because “[p]eople do not usually engage in harmful conduct until
they have justified to themselves the morality of their actions,”163 the
interrogation practice of minimization, by reinforcing these disengagement
mechanisms, is making it easier for suspects to rationalize future harmful
behavior.
3.

The Marginal Offender

One might resist the analysis by arguing that the police cannot
further corrupt guilty suspects, who have already successfully neutralized
159
YUVAL FELDMAN, THE LAW OF GOOD PEOPLE: CHALLENGING STATES’ ABILITY TO
REGULATE HUMAN BEHAVIOR (2018).
160
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
161
See FELDMAN, supra note 159, at 24 (noting the danger of vague legal mandates
because “[i]n the presence of vagueness . . . good people are more likely to find ways to
justify their bad behavior”); 200 (noting the importance of improving the certainty of
punishment rather than its severity, because good people are more likely to behave well when
reminded to do so by the punishment of others).
162
Id. at 162–63 ( “[T]his project suggests not only that minor language choices, which
do not have any instrumental importance, affect behavior in unexpected directions but also
have conflicting effects on people’s behavior.”). See also Alfred L. McAlister, et al.
Promoting Tolerance and Moral Engagement Through Peer Modeling, 6 CULTURAL
DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCH. 363 (2000).
163
BANDURA, supra note 152, at 49.
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the internalized aversion to committing criminal acts (and/or morally
disengaged). This reply is flawed in two ways.
First, those guilty of offending often retain some internal motivation
for complying with law. Recall that the whole point of neutralization and
moral disengagement theory is to explain that the offender may experience
genuine remorse and feelings of guilt. Whether such an individual reoffends depends in part on whether that linkage – between offending and
negative emotions – is weakened or strengthened by the experience of
offending. Committing a long series of offenses is likely to “harden” the
perpetrator, who thereby loses the capacity for feeling guilt or remorse for
that type of offense (perhaps accompanied by entry into a subculture that
esteems that criminality).164 But a single successful neutralization will
usually fail to eliminate the linkage, which is why the offender still
struggles with guilt.
Indeed, the experience of being apprehended for an offense may
instead produce “softening.” Being apprehended may raise the salience of
all the arguments against one’s rationalizations. The perpetrator’s
experience of guilt or remorse may be greater than expected, perhaps
accompanied by the realization that the supporting rationalizations are
flimsy and unconvincing. Neutralization theory therefore applies as much to
the decision to re-offend as it does to the decision to offend for the first
time.165
See, e.g., Maruna & Copes, supra note 140, at 274 (suggesting that “in early stages
of delinquency, youths may need to use neutralizations to relieve the cognitive dissonance
that occurs when their actions are not in line with their values,” but “[b]y using these
neutralizations, delinquents’ commitment to those conventional values are eventually
weakened to the point that there is no longer a need to neutralize”); William W. Minor,
Neutralization as a Hardening Process: Considerations in the Modeling of Change, 62 SOC.
FORCES 995, 1018 (1984) (arguing that “over time, either the desire or the moral disapproval
should dissipate, leading one to either conformity or guilt-free deviance”).
165
Thus, even if, contrary to the claim of LILLYQUIST, supra note 36 and those he cites,
neutralizations were in the first instance after-the-fact rationalizations, they may still provide
the “rationale or moral release mechanism facilitating future offending.” Maruna & Copes,
supra note 140, at 271, citing TRAVIS HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY 208 (1969). See
also RONALD L. AKERS, DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL LEARNING APPROACH 60 (3d ed.
1985) (as quoted in Maruna & Copes, supra note 140, at 271) (If “they successfully mitigate
others’ or self-punishment, they become discriminative for repetition of the deviant acts and,
164
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Second, we should not forget that some of the suspects who listen to
interrogators minimize the crime and blame the victim are innocent. The
probable cause needed for an arrest is a low evidentiary bar, so police are
sometimes wrong in their suspicions of those they interrogate.166 In each
case, a person erroneously suspected of a sexual assault or theft is told by
detectives that the crimes are not serious and the victim or society is really
to blame. Aside from endorsing these neutralizations, the interrogation
conveys the meta-rationalization: “if the cops don’t think this is a big deal,
why should I?” Those who have not previously found it possible to
neutralize a sexual assault or theft may now do so.
The economic concept of marginality is helpful here.167 Moral
minimization works on marginal offenders, those who are still capable of
feeling guilty or shame from the offense. Away from the margin of
criminality are (1) infra-marginal non-offenders, law-abiding citizens
whose circumstances in life do not present them with sufficiently strong
temptations to overcome their internalized commitment not to offend, and
(2) infra-marginal offenders, the individuals who have not internalized the
social norm and will readily offend when the opportunity arises, without
guilt or shame.168 The logic of using moral minimization in interrogation
does not apply to either of these infra-marginal types. Non-offenders should
not confess and the infra-marginal offenders experience no guilt or shame
from which minimization offers relief.169 The logic of minimization,
hence, precede the future commission of the acts.”). On some accounts, neutralization
“theory . . . is best understood as an explanation of persistence or desistance rather than of
onset of offending.” Maruna & Copes, supra note 140, at 271–27. See also Jennifer G.
McCarthy & Anna L. Stewart, Neutralization as a Process of Graduated Desensitisation:
Moral Values of Offenders,” 42 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMPAR. CRIMINOL. 278
(1998).
166
Recall our rough estimate that police use moral minimizations on 400,000 suspects
per year, supra text accompanying note 117-21. If only 20% were innocent, that would
translate into 80,000 suspects. This seems like a conservative estimate as detectives
sometimes interrogate suspects they haven’t even arrested.
167
See, e.g., THOMAS J. MICELI, THE PARADOX OF PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 121–48 (2019).
168
These distinctions could all be made more complex and realistic, as positions on a
continuum, but the basic point would remain.
169
For example, those whose identity comes from a subculture that values a certain kind
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therefore, applies only to the marginal offender. But these offenders are
precisely the ones who might be moved to re-offend or not depending on
whether their neutralizations for the crime are reinforced or diminished.
We call this last observation the “goose/gander” point. The Reid
argument for using moral minimization in interrogations is plausible only in
cases where neutralization theory is plausible. If a suspect possesses no
internal motivation for complying with law, there is no criminogenic risk to
offering moral minimizations, but there is also no plausible case for why
the minimizations would elicit a confession (other than the impermissible
one, that it impliedly promises official leniency).
The goose/gander point is important for another objection. One
might resist our criminogenic claim by noting that the police currently lack
legitimacy for large parts of the American population170 and/or that the legal
estrangement of many Americans renders them immune to the influences
we describe.171 Although our argument would be strengthened for suspects
who view police as legitimate authority figures representing an inclusive
criminal justice system, it does not depend on that perception. Our claim
only depends on suspects expecting police disapproval and instead being
surprised by police endorsement of their neutralizations. From the
surprising fact that even the police minimize the moral seriousness of the
crime and blame others, one can confirm one’s neutralizations. But what if

of criminality will not be inclined to experience guilt or shame when committing those
crimes and therefore have no need to rationalize their behavior with their values. See, e.g.,
Volkan Topalli, The Seductive Nature of Autotelic Crime: How Neutralization Theory Serves
as a Boundary Condition for Understanding Hardcore Street Offending, 76 SOCIO. INQUIRY
475 (2006).
170
See infra text accompanying notes 220-226.
171
See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & Dawn Jeglum Bartusch, Legal Cynicism and
(Subcultural?) Tolerance of Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differences, 32
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 777, 778 (1998) (arguing that “legal cynicism” “is a concept distinct
from subcultural tolerance of deviance” and is found especially “in levels of concentrated
disadvantage, residential instability, and immigrant concentrations”); Monica C. Bell, Police
Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE LAW J. 2054, 2086–87 (2017)
(“A person could simultaneously see the police as a legitimate authority . . . and feel
estranged from the police (believing that the legal system and law enforcement . . . are
fundamentally flawed and chaotic, and therefore send negative messages about the group’s
societal belonging.)”.
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suspects are so skeptical of the police that they do not believe anything the
detective says, including the minimizing statements? Then the goose/gander
point applies: if the suspect completely disbelieves the minimizations, there
is certainly no criminogenic risk, but also no legitimate reason that the
minimizing tactic will elicit a confession.172 Either way, we should abandon
the tactic.
What do the Reid manuals offer in reply to the criminogenic claim
we raise? Almost nothing. With one exception, there is no indication that
the authors of the manuals realize that they could be helping suspects to
neutralize future crimes.173 The exception is a passage from (an early
edition of) a supplemental Reid manual focused solely on child abuse
interrogations, where David Buckley states:
[I]n offering these themes the author is, in no way,
suggesting that a child is to blame for the abuse or that
emotions or alcohol decrease the legal consequences of
abusing a child. . . . [T]he goal of theme development is to
lower the offender’s perception of the seriousness of the
offense and to encourage him to tell the truth about his
offensive behavior. Having the offender take psychological
responsibility for his actions and acknowledge the trauma
and harms he caused his victims is beyond the scope of this
book and will need to be addressed by other professionals

172

See INBAU, ET AL., THIRD EDITION, supra note 133, at 334 (noting the importance of
the interrogator’s credibility with the suspect to the success of interrogation).
173
In the psychological appendix that accompanied INBAU, ET AL., THIRD EDITION,
supra note 133, at 345, Jayne states that the interrogator’s initial accusation – the statements
of “direct positive confrontation” – will “abolish[]” the neutralizations the offender had used
up to that point. But this confrontation occurs before the interrogator offers themes of moral
minimization, which “reintroduce[e]” the neutralizations. Id. Outside of the Reid manuals,
ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note 37, at 341–42, has a section on “correcting the
rationalizations,” but it is concerned only with “correcting” the legal and not the moral
minimizations the interrogators have used. The concern is that rationalization might cause
problems for the prosecution where it “remove[s] the intent necessary to prove a violation of
the law” (the only example given). Id. at 341. The manual does not suggest “correcting” the
interrogator’s efforts to minimize the moral seriousness of the offense nor by moral excuses
and justifications.
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subsequent to the offender’s acknowledgement of the abuse
in the victim.174
Notably, this is the only occasion we discovered in which a Reid manual
acknowledges the falsity of its recommended victim-blaming tactics. The
passage, however, is not reassuring. Buckley tacitly admits that
minimization works against the offender’s taking psychological
responsibility for the harm he has caused the victim. As feelings of guilt and
responsibility are correlated with lowering the risk of recidivism,175 and is
part of rehabilitation therapy,176 Buckley acknowledges the need for
subsequent work “by other professionals” to convince the suspect not to
believe the themes the detectives sympathetically endorsed. No doubt, even
more work is necessary when detectives followed the Reid technique by
reinforcing the offender’s neutralizations.
Nor is there any reason to limit the concern to sex offenses against
children. If moral minimization works to elicit confessions for any crime, it
is because it works at lowering the guilt and shame the offender expected
from committing that crime. Weakening internal incentives to comply
undermines compliance. In short, if the tactic works as advertised, it is also
criminogenic.

174

DAVID M. BUCKLEY, HOW TO IDENTIFY, INTERVIEW & INTERROGATE CHILD ABUSE
OFFENDERS 274 (1st ed. 2006) (emphasis added). The reference to “other professionals” does
not appear in the substantially similar passage of the second edition, BUCKLEY, supra note
28. That edition instead says “Expecting the offender to take psychological responsibility . .
. at this stage of the process is unrealistic and beyond the scope of this book.” Id. at 212.
175
See, e.g., June P. Tangney, et al., Two Faces of Shame: Understanding Shame and
Guilt in the Prediction of Jail Inmates’ Recidivism, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 799, 801 (2014)
(“Inmates’ propensity to experience guilt, assessed shortly upon incarceration, negatively
predicted criminal recidivism during the first year post-release.”). See also United States v.
Beserra, 967 F.2d 254, 256 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J.) (“A person who is conscious of having
done wrong, and who feels genuine remorse . . . is on the way to developing those internal
checks that would keep many people from committing crimes even if the expected costs of
criminal punishment were lower than they are.”).
176
See, e.g., Elias Mpofu, et al., Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy Efficacy for Reducing
Recidivism Rates of Moderate- and High-Risk Sexual Offenders: A Scoping Systemic
Literature Review, 62 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOL. 170, 172 (2018)
(“The efficacy of CBT to reduce recidivism is premised on the assumption that acceptance
of responsibility for offense” or, failing that, to offenders “owning up to responsibility for
their future actions.”).
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The Lessons of Restorative Justice

As another possible objection to our criminogenic claim, one might
optimistically hope that the effects of moral minimization exist only in the
very short term. Perhaps the effect is sufficient to induce a true confession,
but then wears off within hours after the suspect signs a statement and
leaves the influence of the interrogating detectives.
There is nothing to support this optimistic account. In the quotation
above, Buckley does not suggest that the problem he identifies is solved by
the passage of time. To the contrary, some criminal offenders manage to
resist forever any feeling of personal responsibility for their crimes; they
may never empathize with their victims. One might think that the critical
moment for shattering the offender’s neutralizations would be in a
confrontation with police immediately after their apprehension, but that
when detectives instead use that moment to validate those neutralizations,
that they become all the more entrenched.
In any event, an important criminological literature examines the
long term effects of a brief intervention that is the mirror image of moral
minimization – that of restorative justice (“RJ”).177 According RJ theorists,
the ordinary process of criminal trials fails to meaningfully convey to the
offender the serious wrongfulness of their actions and the harm to the
victim.178 RJ theory says that to persuade the offender to take responsibility
requires face-to-face, emotional engagement during which others might
critique the offender’s neutralizations of the crime. This engagement occurs
in RJ “conferences” that include victims, offenders, their families and
friends, and sometimes a convener (often a police officer) trained in
restorative justice techniques.179 Governments in different parts of the world
177

See RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: PHILOSOPHY TO PRACTICE (Heather Strang & John
Braithwaite eds., 2017); Erik Luna, Introduction: The Utah Restorative Justice Conference,
2003 UTAH LAW REV. 1.
178
John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic
Accounts, 25 CRIME & JUST. 1, 53 (1999) (noting that criminal defense lawyers “have a
trained competence” in neutralization methods, such as “condemning condemners, denying
victim, denying injury, and denying responsibility”).
179
See Lawrence W. Sherman & Heather Strang, Restorative Justice as Evidence-Based
Sentencing, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 215, 216 (Joan
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employ restorative justice conferences at different points in the criminal
process: as a diversionary program that avoids prosecution entirely; as a
step after a guilty plea and before formal sentencing; as a supplement to a
sentence of probation; or as a preparation for release from prison.180
John Braithwaite explicitly links the need for RJ to the problem of
neutralization, explaining: “Restorative justice conferences may prevent
crime by facilitating a drift back to law-supporting identities from lawneutralizing ones.”181 Braithwaite explains how offenders find it difficult to
sustain their neutralization techniques when confronted in a conference by
their victims, community members, and even members of their own
family.182 The idea is that engagement will push offenders to appreciate the
wrongfulness of their behavior and the flimsiness of their imagined excuses
and justifications, which makes it more difficult to neutralize the same kind
of crime in the future. If so, then efforts at restorative justice would
decrease recidivism.
The evidence from randomized controlled trials – the gold standard
in empirical testing – shows exactly this result. A recent meta-review
identified studies using a standard protocol for RJ conferences.183 The

Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012) (noting that an RJ conference “brings together
offenders, their victims, and their respective kin and Communities”).
180
See Lawrence W. Sherman, Heather Strang, Evan Mayo-Wilson, Daniel J. Woods &
Barak Ariel, Are Restorative Justice Conferences Effective in Reducing Repeat Offending?
Findings from a Campbell Systematic Review, 31 J. QUANT. CRIMINOL. 1, 3 (2015); United
Nations OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, HANDBOOK ON RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PROGRAMMES 13–
31 (2006).
181
Braithwaite, supra note 178, at 47.
182
Id. at 47–53. With the victim present, “it is hard to sustain denial of victim and denial
of injury.” Id. at 47. “[V]ictim supporters will often move offenders through the
communicative power, the authenticity that comes from their love of the victim.” Id. Second,
“[c]ondemnation of the condemnors is also more difficult to sustain when one’s condemnors
engage in a respectful dialogue about why the criminal behavior of concern to them is
harmful.” Id. “Conferences and healing circles are designed to make the condemners
members of an in-group rather than an outgroup by two moves: inviting participants from all
the in-groups that matter most to offenders; encouraging victims and victim supporters to be
respectful.” Id. at 48.
183
See Lawrence W. Sherman, et al., Are Restorative Justice Conferences Effective in
Reducing Repeat Offending? Findings from a Campbell Systematic Review, 31 J. QUANT.
CRIMINOL. 1 (2015).
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review considered only those studies in which crime victims had consented
to participate in a randomized trial – into RJ or the non-RJ control – before
the random assignment occurred, and which measured recidivism rates for
at least two subsequent years.184 There were ten such studies involving a
total of 1,880 offenders who committed violent or property crimes over five
jurisdictions (and three continents). Nine of out ten studies showed lowered
recidivism for those selected for an RJ conference and this pattern across
the studies is statistically significant.185 The “average effect size is .155
standard deviations less repeat offending among the offenders in cases
randomly assigned to RJ [conferences] than among the offenders in cases
assigned not to have an RJ [conference].”186 Put differently, there were 7 to
45 per cent fewer repeat convictions (or in one study, arrests) across the ten
experiments.187 Contrary to some expectations, the effects were higher in
violent than property crimes, and as high for adult offenders as juvenile
offenders.188
In sum, the studies show that an RJ conference lasting only a few
hours can have effects measured over the next two years.189 If brief RJ
conferences that undermine offender neutralizations can measurably
decrease recidivism over a period of years, there is every reason to think
that the opposite intervention –interrogations that reinforce the offender
neutralizations – can have the opposite effect, also over a period of years.
As RJ conferences decrease recidivism, the obvious risk of their negation is
to increase recidivism. This seems especially true when there is no
subsequent RJ conference, but one might also expect an RJ conference to

184

Id. at 1–3. In addition, the review only looked for studies published in English on or
after 1994, when there was some standardization of RJ procedures. The review excluded
victim-offender mediations, which operate on a very different model.
185
Id. at 11.
186
Id.
187
Id. The benefits of RJ are substantially larger than the costs. See Id. at 18, Table 2
(reporting monetized benefits that exceed costs by ratios of 3.7 to 1 to 8.1 to 1.
188
Id. at 12–13.
189
RJ conferences last one to three hours. See LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN & HEATHER
STRANG, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: THE EVIDENCE 39 (2007). Compare Leo, Interrogation
Room, supra note 82, at 279 Table 6 (finding that 65% of interrogations lasted longer than
30 minutes; 28% lasted longer than an hour); Kelly, et al., supra note 85 at 171 (reporting
on interrogations that average 1.5 hours).
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achieve less if the detectives have first entrenched the offender’s
neutralizations.
While there is much discussion of RJ ideas in the United States,190
and efforts persist to introduce or expand their use,191 no one has previously
noted that it is the common practice of American police interrogators to do
precisely the opposite. RJ theory demonstrates that the first step in RJ
reform would be to constrain the anti-restorative element of moral
minimization.
5.

The Lessons of Entrapment Doctrine

Our claim is that the governmental reinforcement of crime
neutralizations can increase crime. There is a legal doctrine that recognizes
the ability of government actors to cause crime – the entrapment defense.
There would be no need for the defense if it were not possible that
undercover agents or informants could persuade individuals to commit
crimes they would not otherwise commit outside of a sting operation. On
close inspection, entrapment doctrine recognizes the risk of persuading
someone to commit a crime when government agents engage in certain
neutralizations. Although the courts do not use these terms, they find
entrapment in some instances because the undercover agent too effectively
minimized the crime.
In Sorrells v. United States,192 the first Supreme Court case on
entrapment, a crucial fact was the undercover agent’s appeal to a military
bond with the defendant, based on shared service in World War I. The
undercover crime was the sale of intoxicating liquor. As one witness said at
trial, he believed “one former war buddy would get liquor for another.”193
See, e.g., Lynn S. Branham, ‘Stealing Conflicts’ No More?: The Gaps and AntiRestorative Elements in States’ Restorative-Justice Laws, 64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 145 (2020)
(providing a comprehensive analysis of the gaps in American RJ practices).
191
See, e.g., Seema Gajwani & Max G. Lesser, The Hard Truths of Progressive
Prosecution and a Path to Realizing the Movement’s Promise, 64 N.Y. LAW SCHOOL LAW
REV. 69 (2020).
192
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
193
Id. at 440.
190
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The Court vacated the conviction and remanded so the jury could consider
the entrapment defense.194
Something similar occurred in Sherman v. United States, where the
Court held that the defendant, convicted of selling narcotics, was entitled to
an entrapment defense as a matter of law.195 On several occasions, Sherman
had acquired and shared narcotics with an undercover agent he met when
they were both (he thought) undergoing medical treatment for addiction.
The agent had befriended Sherman and told him that he was “not
responding to treatment” and needed to find narcotics.196 On each occasion,
Sherman charged the agent only his expenses in acquiring the drugs, which
the two shared. The Court noted this unconventional motive for distributing
narcotics and held that the agent’s “resort to sympathy” induced Sherman,
as a fellow addict, to secure the drugs.197
Using the terminology of neutralization, Sorrells and Sherman
involved the tactic of appealing to “higher loyalties” than law, based on
bonds of military service or the alleviation of shared pain. Lower court
cases show other uses of the higher loyalties appeal, as when undercover
operatives claim they need the defendant’s help in committing a crime to
make money needed for their children.198 When considering entrapment in
such a context, contemporary courts are wary precisely when government
“takes advantage of [such] an alternate, non-criminal type of motive,”199
i.e., when they morally justify the crime.
194

Id. at 452.
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
196
Id. at 371.
197
Id. at 373. See also id. at 383, 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) (stating
that the government should not be allowed to exploit “[a]ppeals to sympathy” “based on
mutual experiences with narcotics addiction” or “friendship”).
198
See United States v. Kessee, 992 F.2d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.1993). See also United
States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 1419 & n. 21 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Montanez,
105 F.3d 36, 38–39 (1st Cir. 1997).
199
See United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 961 (1st Cir. 1994) (Breyer, J.) (noting
that the entrapment element of “‘inducement’ consists of an ‘opportunity’ [to offend] plus
something else—typically, excessive pressure by the government upon the defendant or the
government's taking advantage of an alternative, non-criminal type of motive."). According
to a Westlaw search on February 1, 2022, thirty-two of the federal cases and three of the state
cases citing Gendron quote its language about the government’s exploitation of a
195
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The last Supreme Court case on the defense, Jacobson v. United
States, is more complicated but tells a similar story. The Court found the
defendant Jacobson entrapped as a matter of law into the crime of ordering
child pornography via the mail. Crucial to the Court’s decision were various
communications the government mailed to Jacobson. One was a letter
ostensibly from an American Hedonist Society, which stated that members
have a “right to read what we desire . . . [and] to seek pleasure without
restrictions placed on us by outdated puritan morality.”201 A second letter
from a different (fake) organization “founded to protect and promote sexual
freedom and freedom of choice” claimed to be lobbying for the repeal of
legislation defining an age of consent.202 A third letter, purportedly from a
private individual, engaged in “mirroring,” i.e., “reflect[ing] whatever the
interests are of the person” addressed, which, for Jacobson, meant stating a
shared interest in images of young men; the fictional letter-writer also
expressed a preference for amateur pornography because “the actors enjoy it
more.”203 Finally, the letter offering to sell child pornography, from a
supposedly distinct source, decried the “hysterical nonsense” about
pornography and asked “why is your government spending millions of
dollars to exercise international censorship while tons of drugs, which
makes yours the world’s most crime ridden country are passed through
easily”?204
200

In one sense, the facts of Jacobson are obviously distinguishable
from a few hours of interrogation because the government’s persuasion
campaign there lasted for 26 months. Yet the longevity of the operation in
Jacobson should not obscure the comparison. Many sting operations using
the same tactics are quite brief, as in Sorrells. And the governmental actions
in Jacobson were clearly the tactics of neutralization. There is denial of
injury (the actors enjoy it), condemnation of the condemnors (blaming the
government for an “outdated puritan morality” and for not taking care of

“noncriminal” “motive.”
200
Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
201
Id. at 544.
202
Id.
203
Id. at 545.
204
Id. at 546.
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more serious crime), and appeals to higher authority (the importance of
sexual freedom and freedom of expression). The overall effect of these
ostensibly different sources of communication is to convey that “that
receiving this material was something that petitioner ought to be allowed to
do,” i.e., “that he had or should have the right to engage in the very
behavior proscribed by law.”205 This is the message of the minimization
tactics reviewed above, especially for sexual assault crimes.
In sum, criminal defendants are sometimes entrapped because the
government agents, using the tools of neutralization, persuade an individual
into a crime. Of course, the undercover agents intend to induce a crime and
police interrogators do not intend to induce the suspect to offend in the
future. But the psychological mechanisms are the same, as are the intended
and unintended risks. Where we recognize the criminogenic possibility for
persuasion in undercover operations, it makes no sense to ignore the parallel
risks of persuasion in interrogation.
6.

Social Norms and Legal Legitimacy

One might object to our criminogenic claim by rejecting the theories
of neutralization and moral disengagement. The theories claim that the
rationalizations precede and cause the rationalized misbehavior, but it is
difficult to rigorously demonstrate the claim empirically, and powerful
evidence does not exist.206
205

Id. at 553.
For longitudinal evidence of the causal effects of neutralization on crime, see, e.g.,
Ian W. Shields & Georgia C. Whitehall, Neutralization & Delinquency Among Teenagers,
21 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 223, 231–32 (1994) (finding among juvenile offenders, weak but
positive correlation between high neutralization scores and subsequent recidivism); Robert
Agnew, The Techniques of Neutralization and Violence, 32 CRIMINOL. 555, 572 (2014) (“the
longitudinal data suggest that neutralization may be a relatively important cause of
subsequent violence”). An experimental paper demonstrates how an interlocutor can
successfully influence subsequent behavior by arguing for or against the neutralizations. See
Immo Fritsche, Predicting Deviant Behavior by Neutralization: Myths and Findings, 26
DEVIANT BEHAV. 483, 494–95 (2005) (finding experimental support). Yet other evidence
fails to validate the theory. See Maruna & Copes, supra note 140, at 226–27, 228 (concluding
that “the relationship between neutralization and offending is probably not a causal one”);
Morris & Copes, supra note 131. The bottom line is that empirical evidence on the causal
effects of neutralization is ultimately mixed.
206
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We have two responses. First, there is the goose/gander point
previously explained. The case for using moral minimization is only
plausible if neutralization theory is plausible.207 If neutralization theory is
false, there is no reason to engage in moral minimization. Our second reply
is to note that other legal theories and literatures – besides restorative justice
and entrapment doctrine – lead to the same conclusion: that moral
minimization is criminogenic.
a.

Social Norms and Expressive Theory

One of the law’s expressive mechanisms for influencing behavior
derives from its ability to signal and strengthen the informal sanctions that
enforce social norms.208 Social norms involve a pattern of disapproval for
counter-normative behavior. The expectation of disapproval itself creates
some incentive to follow the norm because people generally value the
esteem of others.209 Disapproval also predicts more serious informal
sanctions ranging from a censorious look or comment, to gossip and social
ostracism, to violence.210
Where law and social norms overlap, these informal sanctions
explain some legal compliance. People may presume that democratically
enacted laws reveal underlying attitudes of disapproval for the behavior the
law condemns, so that one needs to comply with law to avoid disapproval,
confrontation, and negative gossip. For example, local laws against public
smoking and in favor of public breastfeeding of babies respectively signal
207

That is why the Reid manual emphasizes reinforcing the same neutralizations the
suspect used to commit the crime. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
208
See, e.g., RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND
LIMITS 139–52 (2015) [hereinafter MCADAMS, EXPRESSIVE POWERS]; Richard H.
McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OREGON LAW REV. 339–390 (2000)
[hereinafter McAdams, Attitudinal Theory]; Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of
Expressive Law, 88 IOWA LAW REV. 35 (2002).
209
Loss of esteem serves as a basic norms sanction. See MCADAMS, EXPRESSIVE
POWERS, supra note 208, at 1141–43; McAdams, Attitudinal Theory, supra note 208, at 142–
43. See also GEOFFREY BRENNAN & PHILIP PETTIT, THE ECONOMY OF ESTEEM: AN ESSAY
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL SOCIETY (2004).
210
See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 57–59 (1994); MCADAMS,
EXPRESSIVE POWERS, supra note 208, at 83–84, 139–40.
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disapproving attitudes about exposing others to one’s cigarette smoke and
approving attitudes about breastfeeding.211 A large part of the compliance
with under-enforced laws may be due to law’s expressive effects.212 But
even if the expected criminal sanctions against, say, theft, are much more
serious than the informal sanctions, the latter still add to the formal
sanctions and generate higher levels of compliance.
Consistent with these ideas, the empirical evidence further
demonstrates that some people comply with law out of a sense of
reciprocity with others.213 For instance, people are more likely to pay their
taxes if they believe others are paying their taxes; less likely if they believe
cheating is rampant.214 Dan Kahan explains the psychology: “The more
strongly she anticipates being condemned by others should she be caught,
the more likely an individual is to refrain from evading. By the same token,
the more regret or remorse an individual believes she'd experience for
engaging in evasion, the less likely she is to do so.”215 Thus, if perceived
compliance is high, the expected social disapproval from violating the law
is high, which makes it shameful; if non-compliance is understood to be
widespread, then the expected disapproval and shame seems not so great.

211

See MCADAMS, EXPRESSIVE POWERS, supra note 208, at 143, 145.
See, e.g., Cevat G. Aksoy, et al., Do Laws Shape Attitudes? Evidence from Same-Sex
Relationship Recognition Policies in Europe, 124 EUROPEAN ECON. REV. (2020) (Article
103399) (finding that legal changes recognizing same-sex unions preceded increased tolerant
attitudes toward sexual minorities); Roberto Galbiati, et al., How Laws Affect the Perception
of Norms: Empirical Evidence from the Lockdown, PLOS ONE (Sept. 24, 2021) (finding that
lockdown orders significantly strengthened perception of the relevant social norm); Patricia
Funk, Is There an Expressive Function of Law?, 9 AMER. LAW & ECON. REV. 135 (2007)
(finding that mandatory voting laws increased voting for reasons not explained by expected
sanctions); Maggie Wittlin, Buckling Under Pressure: An Empirical Test of the Expressive
Effects of Law, 28 YALE J. REG. 419 (2011) (finding evidence that mandatory seat belt laws
increase belt usage for reasons not explained by sanctions).
213
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and
Law, 102 MICH. LAW REV. 71, 74 nn.4–8 (2003).
214
Id. at 80–85 and especially 81, n.21. More recent and more sophisticated empirical
research reaches the same conclusions. See Cristina M. Bott, et al., You’ve Got Mail: A
Randomized Field Experiment on Tax Evasion, 66 MANAGEMENT SCI. 2801, 2810–12 (2020)
(informing taxpayers of high compliance rate increased self-reported taxable income); James
Alm, et al., When You Know Your Neighbour Pays Taxes: Information, Peer Effects and Tax
Compliance, 38 FISCAL STUDIES 587 (2017) (same).
215
Kahan, supra note 213, at 81.
212
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Moral minimization obviously weakens these informal incentives.
Detectives strive to convince the suspect that the crime is not serious by
giving reasons to expect that the social disapproval will be lower than the
suspect initially believes. As noted, the Reid manual identifies this precise
mechanism: “[I]f the suspect . . . believes that the interrogator can
understand and seem to forgive the offense or suspect, he may believe that
others will also be sympathetic and forgiving.”216 The logic is strong
because the suspect expects the police, perhaps more than anyone, to
disapprove of felonies. Yet if burning a structure is a mere “prank”217 or if
sexual assault merely demonstrates that “Everybody fucks up in life,”218
then the expected social disapproval is lowered. Moral minimizations thus
undermine the enforcement of social norms and the external incentives to
comply with a law that embodies those norms.
Moreover, the tactic explicitly attacks the reciprocity motive for
compliance by referring to how “everybody” misbehaves in life and
“anyone” would commit the crime under the same circumstances.219 For
employee theft crimes, one manual offers the detectives the most inflated
figures for the frequency of such crimes – that “75% of employees steal
from the workplace and that most do so repeatedly” – precisely to allow the
detective to tell the suspect that far more people commit this type of crime
than they had previously assumed.220 The empirical evidence suggests that
if people believe a crime is exceptionally common, it weakens their
reciprocal incentives to obey the law.
b.

Legal Legitimacy Theory

Another literature in law and social science finds that compliance
with the law is inextricably linked with the public’s perception of the law’s
legitimacy.221 In recent years, much has been written about the law’s
216

INBAU, ET AL., THIRD EDITION, supra note 133, at 341.
Commonwealth v. Baye, 967 N.E.2d 1120, 1130 (Mass. 2012)
218
State v. Baker, 465 P.3d 860, 864 (Haw. 2020).
219
Id. and INBAU, ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 27, at 210.
220
See SENESE, supra note 27, at 141.
221
See generally MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (1921) (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich eds., 2013).
217
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procedural sources of legitimacy, and the evidence that many people are
more likely to obey law and cooperate with law enforcement if they
perceive the courts and police to treat them fairly and with respect.222 Other
research emphasizes what might be called the substantive sources of law’s
legitimacy, where many people are more likely to obey law if its content
aligns with their own moral intuition.223 Law is less effective in generating
compliance when people believe the law consistently deviates from what is
morally right.
To see the legitimacy problem posed by moral minimization,
consider some themes from the Reid training that directly attack the
substantive or procedural legitimacy of regulatory offenses. For smuggling
and customs offenses, interrogators should: “[b]lame the laws, rules,
regulations and policies as being unfair, unrealistic or outdated.”224 For
passport fraud the suggestion is: “Blame the government policy for placing
unfair restrictions on certain countries.”225 For lacking the appropriate
hunting license: “Blame the licensing agency for not providing enough
licensed guides.”226
These examples, however, only make explicit what is already
implicit: moral minimizations inevitably drive a wedge between the formal
criminal law and common moral intuitions. The criminal law treats the
offender’s conduct as morally serious, but the detectives say it is not
222

For evidence of the relationship between procedural justice and legal compliance, see
TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (revised ed. 2006); Jonathan Jackson, et al., Why
Do People Comply with the Law? Legitimacy and the Influence of Legal Institutions, 52
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1051, 1052–53 (2012).
223
See John M. Darley, Citizens’ Sense of Justice and the Legal System, 10 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCI. 10 (2001); Elizabeth Mullen & Janice Nadler, Moral Spillovers:
The Effect of Moral Mandate Violations on Deviant Behavior, 44 J. EXP. SOC. PSYCH. 1239
(2008); Paul H. Robinson, et al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. LAW REV. 1940
(2010).
224
Id. at 238 (example A2). Alternatively: “Blame the bureaucracy for making it so
difficult to obtain the proper licenses to import items such as protected wildlife or property”
(example A1) and “Blame the government/country for trying to maintain a monopoly on
these goods” (example A5). Id.
225
Id. at 210 (example 1).
226
SENESE, supra note 27, at 165 (example C1). Other legitimacy-attacking themes:
“Blame the license fee as being cost prohibitive,” Id. (example C4; cf. Id. at 166 examples
D3 and E3) or “Blame license centers for being too far away.” Id. at 166 (example E2).
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serious. The law treats the offender’s claimed excuses and justifications as
irrelevant, but the detective insists they are relevant. In situations where the
law refuses to blame the victim, the detective energetically blames the
victim. In all cases, the interrogator is criticizing the substantive content of
the criminal law for its failure to track morality, thus undermining one
mechanism for legal compliance. Moral minimization seems a peculiarly
effective tool for undermining legal legitimacy because it is carried out by
law enforcement officers – whom the suspects expect to support the legal
rule.227
To summarize this section: if neutralization theory is correct, then
moral minimization probably increases confessions and increases crime. In
particular, the success of restorative justice conferences and appellate court
reasoning about entrapment both demonstrate that a single psychologically
intense interaction can trigger future criminal behavior. Furthermore, if
social norms theory and/or legitimacy theory is correct, then moral
minimization probably increases crime even if it has no effect on
confessions.
C. The Criminogenic Risk in Practice
Synthesizing the various causal arguments of the prior section, we
can describe the criminal contexts in which the criminogenic risk is most
and least compelling. Moral minimization poses the greatest risk of
inducing future crimes when (1) the suspect is a marginal offender, (2) the
bases of moral minimization are generalizable In addition, as incarceration
sometimes prevents recidivism, we add a third condition, (3) that the
resulting criminal sentence leaves open the possibility of recidivism. By
contrast, the criminogenic risks are minimal or non-existent when the
suspect is an infra-marginal offender, the moral minimization is not
generalizable, or the criminal sentence itself incapacitates all further
offending. As we show, this means that the risks are greatest for crimes like
theft, assault, and sexual assault and are least significant for the crime of
homicide.
227

Of course, those populations who do not perceive the criminal law as having any
legitimacy or who are estranged from the law, will be unaffected by this problem of moral
minimization. See supra text accompanying notes 173–174.
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First, we previously explained the significance of an offender being
marginal. If the suspect is a professional criminal, for example, who
commits a certain crime whenever the frequent opportunity arises, then it is
unlikely such a person feels any need to neutralize the crime. Such inframarginal offenders have lost the capacity for feeling guilt or shame for the
particular crime and are unmotivated by social disapproval or the legitimacy
of law. They are therefore not made more likely to offend by moral
minimization, but also not made more likely to confess (the goose/gander
point). For most crimes, many offenders are marginal, but for some crimes,
there may be very few marginal offenders. Drug crimes are a likely
example. That sort of black market, malum prohibitum offense – selling
contraband goods to willing buyers – are frequently committed by
professionals who do not struggle with guilt or shame over the offense.
Second, we referred to moral minimizations being generalizable to
future offenses. Trivializing a crime, as by suggesting that it causes no harm
to steal from a corporation or wealthy individual, offers an excuse that
readily applies to future opportunities for crime. Blaming a crime on
alcohol or drug use does the same, as the offender is likely to be under the
influence again in the future. Most obviously, blaming a female victim of
assault or rape for the stereotypical reasons we saw in the scripts and
appellate opinions offers an excuse that readily applies to future crimes,
even against the same victim. Most moral minimizations are like these.
Yet some excuses do not generalize. Consider two murder cases
discussed in Part I. Where police detectives offered the suspect the excuse
for murder that he was exacting revenge against the victim for having killed
the suspect’s brother,228 that rationalization probably does not generalize. At
least where only one person committed the sibling’s murder, and the
suspect does not have other family members suffering the same fate, the
offender is unlikely to again encounter another temptation for this kind of
revenge. In another case, detectives proposed to a mother that she set a fire
to kill her special needs daughter because she was making it impossible for
228

People v. Jones, No. 1–17–1623, 2021 WL 1227837, *2 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 31, 2021).
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her to properly raise her other three children.229 Again, it is not apparent that
such an excuse could ever apply to a future situation the mother will face. A
non-murder example is the accidental hit-and-run crime. Most people who
accidentally hit someone with their car and then flee will not accidentally
hit another person in the future; reinforcing their neutralizations for flight
cannot risk causing many of them to commit the crime again.
Third, a criminal sentence may prevent future recidivism. There is
no criminogenic risk if the resulting confession leads to sentence of
incarceration for life and the offender cannot re-offend in prison. If a 60year old man convicted of sexual abuse of a child receives a thirty-year
sentence, he is unlikely to re-offend regardless of the reinforcement of his
neutralizations, in which case there is no criminogenic downside to using
the tactic to secure his confession.
In most instances, however, the resulting sentence will not
permanently incapacitate the offender. First, some offenses – revenge-based
assaults, for example – can be and are committed within prison, so the
neutralization might promote recidivism during incarceration.230 Second,
the Reid manuals propose moral minimizations for crimes that typically do
not produce life-long prison terms: assault and sexual assault, hate crimes,
arson, embezzlement, and other theft crimes. Such offenders, like most
offenders, are released from prison, so we must be concerned about their reoffending.231
To be clear, we do not argue in favor of prison as a means of
incapacitation. To the contrary, if one wishes to decrease society’s use of
prison, and especially if one wants to eliminate its use, it is essential to take
every non-coercive action possible to dissuade offenders from re-offending,
which certainly includes not encouraging future crime through moral
229
230

See Coughlin, supra note 14 (citing the transcripts).
See Christopher Lewis, The Paradox of Recidivism, 70 EMORY L.J. 1209, 1221–1222

(2021).
231

See Danielle Kaeble, Time Served in State Prison, 2016, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN 1 (Nov. 2018) (“Most violent offenders (57%) released from state
prison in 2016 served less than three years in prison before their initial release. About 1 in
25 violent offenders (3.6%) served 20 years or more.”).
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minimization. Put differently, we should never allow government to
perversely justify an increment of imprisonment for its incapacitating effect
by saying that an offender is a particular threat to re-offend when that claim
is even partly true because police detectives persuaded a marginal offender
on the generalizable excuses and justifications for the crime.232
The net result of this analysis is that the criminogenic risk does not
seem particularly large for the offenses of homicide or hit-and-run, but is
great for the far more common crimes of theft, assault, robbery, and sexual
assault.233 Because there are so many perpetrators of these latter crimes, it
stands to reason that some non-trivial number of them are marginal
offenders. The moral minimizations police offer are generalizable reasons
for trivializing the crime, for avoiding responsibility, and for blaming
victims. And there is no reason to think that the criminal sentence is
permanently incapacitating: assault and sexual assault obviously occurs in
prison; for all of these crimes, most offenders are eventually released.
To further illustrate, we offer a psychological account of a
hypothetical theft case using “Joe,” the prototypical offender named in the
manual’s interrogation scripts. Let’s say that Joe steals from his employer.
Before embezzling funds, he rationalized away the social norms that would
otherwise constrain him, wanting to preserve his identity as a “good person”
who is not a “thief,” despite this anticipated crime. Joe initially succeeded at
this rationalization by imagining that he is the true victim of his employer,
who underpays him (denial of victim); that the corporate employer is not
really harmed by the amount he takes (denial of injury); and that his duty as
a parent and spouse requires that he do what he must to provide for his
family (higher loyalties). Substantial evidence suggests that employees do,
in fact, rationalize workplace theft by focusing on what they perceive as the
232

Similarly, we disagree with criminologists who think there is only a social gain to
fine-turning moral minimization. See Copes, et al., supra note 36 (reporting on interviews
with 59 convicted identity thieves still in prisons, as a means of helping future Reid-trained
investigators interrogate identity thieves).
233
See John Gramlick, What the Data Says (and Doesn’t Say) About Crime in the United
States, Pew Research Center (Nov. 20, 2020) (showing that murder and non-negligent
manslaughter rates are about 5 per 100,000, while other felonies range from 42.6 per 100,000
(rape) to 1,549 per 100,000 (larceny/theft)).
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unfairness of being paid too little,234 meaning that many such offenders
need to neutralize their crime and are therefore marginal.
Yet Joe’s rationalizations are tenuous. Joe realizes at some level that
his reasoning is self-serving and suspect.235 This would be true even if he
had secured some support for his neutralizations from friends or coconspirators because he knows that they are biased in his favor and not
representative of how his broader community would view his act of taking
his employer’s money. While his salary is not as high as he wishes, he
worries that there is no real sense in which he is underpaid. (He is paid
more than some, paid more than he used to be, and was lucky in some ways
to have the job at all). If he lets himself think about the aggregate amount of
employee theft at his firm, he realizes that his employer is seriously harmed
by such theft. And he suspects that he will use much of the money he takes
on himself personally, not his family.
Now assume that Joe is arrested. At this moment, he may think
about these counter-considerations and “see through” his neutralizations.
When “caught,” he is forced to consider how his community will regard his
behavior; he worries that most people will find the pro-responsibility
reasons more compelling than his self-serving rationalizations. This is the
time when he is most likely to reject his neutralizations, which would mean
that he would find it difficult to rely on them again in the future.
Except that American detectives step into this pivotal psychological
moment armed with the Reid technique. They surprise Joe not merely by
understanding all of his rationalizations, but by pre-emptively endorsing
them. In the interrogation, Joe learns that, not merely close friends and
family, but even strangers support his rationalizations. And not merely
234

See Jerald Greenberg, Stealing in the Name of Justice: Informational and
Interpersonal Moderators of Theft Reactions to Underpayment Inequity, 54 ORG. BEHAV. &
HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 81 (1993); Jerald Greenberg, Employee Theft as a Reaction to
Underpayment Inequity: The Hidden Cost of Pay Cuts, 75 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 561 (1990).
235
See INBAU, ET AL., THIRD EDITION, supra note 133, at 331 (noting that the defense
mechanisms of rationalization and projection “function through distorting or denying
reality,” but “this does not mean that the individual loses touch with reality; reality has
merely been redefined.”).
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unbiased strangers, but law enforcement officials whom Joe had expected to
be biased against him, i.e., the most likely in his community to condemn a
felony. These enforcers of the law do not endorse his rationalizations
blandly, but with apparent heartfelt emotion, looking him in the eye with a
hand on his shoulder.236 Over the interrogation, Joe begins to think he was
right to begin with and wrong to doubt himself. Whatever the law may say,
community mores do not hold him to be a real thief. He actually is the
victim; his employer really didn’t suffer harm; and he in fact acted to fulfil
a higher duty to his family. Just like the detective said.
Which means he is now a greater risk for recidivism. If he ever
encounters another opportunity to steal from an employer, he will find it
easier to neutralize the crime than the first time, and easier than would have
been the situation where the police offered no such reinforcement. But even
if he never encounters an opportunity to steal again from an employer, the
neutralizations generalize beyond that situation. Given an opportunity, he is
more likely to steal from any corporation or individual, even one does not
employ him, if their wealth might prevent them from being seriously
harmed by the theft (denial of harm). He is more likely to steal from
someone who wronged him in some way (denial of victim), perhaps a
neighbor or family member who refused a loan he needed and thought he
deserved. And he is more likely to steal in any circumstance with the
possibility of benefitting his family (higher loyalty).
In sum, although there are a few situations in which the
criminogenic risks of moral minimization seem insignificant, in most cases,
they are substantial.
D. The Expressive Objection to the Criminogenic Claim
An objection to our criminogenic claim is that other government
expression contradicts the detective’s moral minimization. On this view,
after a confession is obtained, the government disavows and nullifies the
detective’s message by the subsequent prosecution, conviction, and criminal
punishment of the offender. The criminal defendant infers from the
236

See id. at 346 (“Sympathy and expression abound from the interrogator’s voice.”).
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experience that there was no truth to the interrogating detectives’ moral
minimizations. The interrogator said the crime was not serious, that anyone
would have done the same, and that the real blame lies with the victim or
society, but the prosecution and punishment show that society regards the
crime to be serious and the suspect-convict to be morally responsible. The
criminal process expresses the true moral status of the convict’s conduct
and this “counter-programming” erases any effects of the detective’s moral
minimization.
This optimistic account connects to an old idea in criminal theory
that punishment is expressive, i.e., that it communicates societal
condemnation of the criminal act.237 This expressive objection is, however,
unduly optimistic, for three reasons.
First, as previously discussed, not everyone who is interrogated is
convicted. Some suspects who receive the moral minimizations are innocent
and not convicted; some are guilty, but do not confess and are not
convicted. Each year, thousands of such suspects hear the interrogator
minimize the seriousness of a category of offenses and/or blame victims,
but receive no expressive corrective from the law.
Second, although we contend below that most suspects will never
infer that the detectives were lying in their moral minimizations, we note
that a distinct problem arises if suspects do reach this conclusion. Police
deception undermines procedural legitimacy.238 The basic claims of this
literature are that (1) “citizens are more likely to comply and cooperate with
police and obey the law when they view the police as legitimate,” and (2)
“[t]he most common pathway that the police use to increase citizen
perceptions of legitimacy is through the use of procedural justice,” which
237

Indeed, even to define punishment, one influential account says that it is necessary
to distinguish criminal sanctions from other forms of harsh treatment the government
imposes on rule violators. See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in
DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95–118 (1970). See also
ANTONY DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2001); Kenworthey
Bilz, Testing the Expressive Theory of Punishment, 13 J. EMP. LEGAL STUDIES 358 (2016).
238
See Margareth Etienne & Richard McAdams, Police Deception in Interrogation as a
Problem of Procedural Legitimacy, 54 TEX. TECH LAW REV. 21 ((2021).
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involves the police treating civilians fairly and respectfully.239 Legitimacy
“increase[s] both willing deference to rules and the decisions of the police
and courts, as well as the motivation to help with the task of maintaining
social order in the community.”240 Yet a simple enough prerequisite for
police legitimacy is honesty; lying destroys procedural justice.241 Thus, if
suspects later infer that the detectives were deceptive when offering moral
minimizations, the tactic is still criminogenic. To pin one’s hopes on
suspects figuring out that the sympathy the police extended was merely a
ploy, is merely to hope that the system loses procedural instead of
substantive legitimacy. Either damages legal compliance.
Third, and most importantly, even when the guilty suspect confesses
and is convicted, criminal proceedings will usually fail to undo the effect of
the neutralizations. Remember that what matters here is not the message
intended, or the message that most citizens receive, but the message the
suspect receives from his encounter with the criminal justice system. To
begin, nothing in the moral minimization technique leads the suspect to
expect not to be prosecuted. Indeed, the manuals repeatedly express concern
that the police not make promises of that level of leniency, for it would
obviously incentivize false confessions if suspects thought that a confession
would be the immediate end of the matter.242 Even after moral
minimization, therefore, the suspect expects to be prosecuted and the
prosecutor’s decision to bring charges does not negate the detective’s
reinforcement of the suspect’s neutralizations.
Some may argue that a defendant who pleads guilty after a
confession must show some new understanding that their behavior was
239
Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, U.S. DEPT. JUST.
OFF. CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS. (May 2015), at 11.
240
Tom R. Tyler, et al., Psychology of Procedural Justice and Cooperation, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4011 (Gerben Bruinsma & David
Weisburd eds., 2014).
241
See Etienne & McAdams, supra note 238; Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old is New
Again: Fundamental Fairness and the Legitimacy of Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO STATE J.
CRIM. L. 105, 109–110 (2005) (stating that trust and belief that authority figures will act
fairly is a key factor for procedural justice).
242
See INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 203, 425; JAYNE & BUCKLEY, FIELD GUIDE, supra
note 20, at 277–79.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4044000

CRIMINOGENIC RISKS OF INTERROGATION

65

seriously wrong and not the victim’s fault. Yet a guilty plea need not
represent any appreciation of wrongdoing. Defendants often plead guilty for
strategic reasons having little to do with consciousness of wrongdoing. The
literature on false confessions and resulting guilty pleas is one example
where defendants do not believe what they say in the plea colloquy.243 The
literature on remorse during pleas and sentencing hearings tells a similar
story.244 The concern that defendants sometimes tell the court just what it
wants to hear245 is consistent with the notion that we may not really know
what portion of the minimizing narrative the defendant might believe.
Next, consider the effect of the judge’s sentencing decision.
Punishment is arguably different, but the mere fact of punishment is not
sufficient to negate the moral minimizations. First, there is uncertainty in
the communicative content of non-traditional punishments, i.e., probation,
fines, and community service.246 Even when the sentence involves prison,
some observers may think that an unexpectedly light sentence fails to
condemn the criminal act and even condones it. Consider the infamous
sentence of six months of prison for Brock Turner for the crime of rape.247
Many understood the sentence as failing to condemn the crime. If the
detectives in his case had, in interrogations of Turner, minimized the
seriousness of his crime and/or blamed the victim, as with scripts noted
above, it seems doubtful that such a short sentence, far below the mean for
rape, would obliterate the effect of their neutralizations. To the contrary, a
Guilty Pleas and False Confessions, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Nov. 24,
2015), (“People who falsely confess are likely to believe that they have no meaningful chance
of winning at trial.”).
244
See Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility and Regulating Advocacy: Making
Defendants Pay for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y. U LAW REV. 2103, 2123–24 (2003)
(explaining that federal courts make highly subjective findings of remorse in determining
whether a defendant has accepted responsibility for their conduct for sentencing purposes);
Rocksheng Zhong, Judging Remorse, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 133, 142 (“The
existing empirical literature, though limited, generally agrees that offenders’ remorse, in
practice, does have an impact on legal decision-makers’ perceptions and judgments about
them.”).
245
Etienne, supra note 244, at 2162–63 (“True remorse cannot be scheduled to appear
precisely at the time of the crime or on the sentencing date”).
246
See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 CHI. LAW REV. 591
(1996).
247
See Peter Fimrite, Ex-Stanford Swimmer to Serve 6 Months in Unconscious Woman’s
Rape, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (June 3, 2016).
243
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felon may infer from unexpected leniency that the minimizations were
correct.248
Even where the suspect is convicted and the criminal sentence is
widely perceived by the public as fully sufficient to condemn the criminal
act, the punishment will not necessarily undo the effect of moral
minimization on the offender. The offender has now received two
conflicting governmental messages: the first from the detectives and the
second from the sentencing judge who reveals the punishment the state will
inflict. The question is how the offender will resolve the expressive conflict.
The optimistic account is that the second communication
(punishment) nullifies the first (moral minimization). Yet another
possibility exists. The offender may view the minimizing message as
demonstrating that the criminal sentence does not actually reflect
community sentiment. The public is sometimes surprised by the harshness
as well as the leniency of a particular criminal sentence, so any given
sentence might not reflect common morality.249 If so, then instead of
interpreting the judge’s criminal sentence as negating the detective’s moral
minimizations, the offender can interpret the detective’s moral
minimizations as negating the condemnatory message of the judge’s
criminal sentence.
The latter inference is the more likely one, for three reasons. First,
the interrogators’ communications may be more powerful than the judge’s.
The detectives deliver their patient minimizations in the intimate space of
an interrogation room, as part of an emotional performance seeking to
connect sympathetically with the offender.250 The judge is often pressed for
time and delivers the sentence at some remove from the defendant in a busy
248

To be clear, we do not believe that the police use of neutralizations in interrogation
should ever justify longer prison terms. Instead, we think that the failure of shorter prison
terms or alternative sentencing to undo the damage of moral minimization is a reason not to
use the tactic.
249
See, e.g., Robinson, et al., supra note 223, at 1974 (reporting that many people
believe the appropriate punishment for drug offenses, three-strikes laws, strict liability
offenses, and felony murder are far below actual punishments); 1975–78 (describing other
studies finding the same divergences).
250
Recall David Simon’s description of detectives putting their arm around the suspect
and appearing to be on the verge of tears. SIMON, supra note 80, at 212.
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public courtroom, using legal boilerplate, and is therefore less likely to seek
or create an emotional connection with the defendant. Detectives are
selected in part for their ability to develop rapport with suspects during
interrogation, but judges are elite technocrats selected more for legal or
political proficiency. Suspects might imagine the detectives being more in
touch with common morality.
Second, that fact that the judge has “the last word” by speaking after
the detectives is not an advantage. To the contrary, people are often subject
to “confirmation bias,” in which they interpret new evidence in a distorted
way to preserve their existing belief.251 People are particularly prone to
confirmation when it comes to preserving positive opinions about
themselves; they resist negative feedback.252 As the detective’s minimizing
message reinforces the offender’s pre-existing neutralizations, the literature
on the bias predicts that the offender will make all possible inferences to
preserve the neutralizing beliefs. Confirmation bias is even more likely
when beliefs are motivated rather than rational,253 as is true here: the
offender simply prefers to believe that the detectives have articulated
community mores more accurately than the law or the judge. The offender
knows that the criminal law does sometimes “get it wrong” (fails to track
moral intuitions), and conveniently reasons that this sentence is one of those
occasions. Offenders want to believe the forgiving and justifying things the
detective says, not what society wants its criminal punishment to express.
The self-serving inference is always easier than the self-critical one.
Third, if there were an advantage to the judge having the “last word”
in a sentencing hearing, it would only be because the judge could answer
the specific minimizing statements the detectives made. Yet this possible
advantage is lost because the judge usually has no idea what the detectives
251

See, e.g., Joshua Klayman, Varieties of Confirmation Bias, in PSYCHOLOGY OF
LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 387 (Jerome Busemeyer, et al. eds, 1995); Raymond S.
Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN.
PSYCHOL. 175 (1998).
252
See David Eil & Justin M. Rao, The Good News-Bad News Effect: Asymmetric
Processing of Objective Information about Yourself. 3 AMER. ECON. J.: MICROECON.114
(2011).
253
See Daniel C. Molden & E. Tory Higgins, Motivated Thinking, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING 295, 295–96 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G.
Morrison eds., 2005).
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said to the offender during interrogation. If the defendant contests the
voluntariness of the confession and if the defendant’s briefing describes the
minimizing details (even though they are not usually legally relevant on
their own), the judge would learn what the detectives said. Yet that is rare.
Ordinarily, the judge is ignorant of (1) which of the offenders they are
sentencing were subject to the tactic of moral minimization, and, when the
tactic was employed, (2) what the particular moral minimizations were.
Detectives tailor their minimizing message to match the offender’s actual
neutralizations, but it hardly be called a “counter-message” if the judge does
not tailor his remarks to what the detectives said.
If the prosecutor and judge fail, the final objection to our claim may
be that other criminal justice players provide a counter-message that undoes
the criminogenic damage of moral minimization. Perhaps the detectives,
defense lawyer, jury, or victim provide the expressive antidote. As things
stand, however, where there is no recognition of the problem, there is no
reason to think these actors do provide an effective remedy.
We find no evidence that any detectives “debrief” the suspect after
interrogation, which detectives might naturally resist as long as there is a
chance the defendant might try to recant the confession (which such
debriefing would make more likely). Defense attorneys may explain to
defendants that their rationalizations for the crime are not legally relevant,
but it seems improbable that any will articulate the moral wrongfulness of
their client’s behavior to their client.
Juries offer no counter-message for the simple reason that almost all
cases are resolved by guilty plea.254 We pause to note that this observation
provides another reason that the scarcity of criminal juries is troubling.
Juries are the best positioned of all actors in the system to undo moral
minimization. They are a collective body drawn from the community who
can therefore speak for the community.255 If jury trials were common, we
254

Shari Seidman Diamond & Jessica M. Salerno, Reasons for the Disappearing Jury
Trial: Perspectives from Attorneys and Judges, 81 LA. L. REV. 119, 122 (stating that 3.6% of
federal criminal cases were disposed of by jury trials in 2013).
255
Youngjae Lee, The Criminal Jury, Moral Judgments, and Political Representation,
2018 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 1255, 1270–1272 (2018).
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would therefore worry less (but still worry) about the criminogenic effects
of moral minimization. Note that when the first Reid interrogation manual
was published in 1962, jury trials were far more common than they are
today, which might be one reason for the absence of concerns about the
criminogenic effects when moral minimization was first introduced.
Victim impact testimony is promising. If presented in front of the
convicted defendant at a sentencing hearing, it might undo some of the
damage of moral minimization. The most plausible case is where the
minimization involved a detective claiming that the victim was not “really”
harmed; given the chance, victims can powerfully articulate their harm.
Moreover, the place of esteem and respect with which those statements are
regarded within the proceeding offers evidence of the victim’s worth,
pushing against any victim-blaming narrative.256 The need to remedy moral
minimization therefore provides a non-standard rationale for giving the
victim this voice.257
But there are severe limitations. Even among the offenses for which
we claim the criminogenic effect is likely, not every case has an individual
natural victim (some theft victims are collectives or corporations), not every
state guarantees the victim’s right to give testimony in every case,258 and
not every victim is available or willing to testify in this way (especially in
sexual assault cases). When victims do testify, they are (thankfully)
ignorant that the detectives minimized the offense during interrogation, so
they cannot frame their remarks to address the minimizations. Finally, while
we think victims can convincing speak to harm, we worry that the
detective’s victim-blaming tactics may render the offender immune to being
persuaded by what the victim says in court, or from the respect the judge
shows the victim. Certainly, victim impact statements would work better to
induce the offender’s sympathy and remorse if they occurred without the

256

See Bilz, supra note 237.
See MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE
OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS 338 (2002). See also Julian V. Roberts & Edna Erez, Communication
in Sentencing: Exploring the Expressive Function of Victim Impact Statements, 10 INT'L REV.
OF VICTIMOLOGY 223, 226 (2004).
258
See DUBBER, supra note 257.
257
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government officials having first privately “reinforced” the offender’s
reasons for blaming the victim.259
Our ultimate point is rather simple. There are a variety of
governmental actors who communicate, by words or actions, to criminal
offenders. For a variety of reasons, it matters to the offender’s future
behavior whether the government delivers a unified and consistent message
– the offender’s conduct was seriously wrong and the offender was
responsible for it – or conflicting messages that both condemn and condone
the criminal act. The presence of moral minimization is particularly likely
to compromise or nullify the contrary messages because they are delivered
at a critical early moment in an empathetic manner by detectives from
whom the suspect expects disapproval. Whatever the possibilities for
remediation with other messages, the criminal system is not designed to
offset the criminogenic damage of moral minimizations.
In sum, moral minimization undermines internal and informal
motivations for legal compliance. American police detectives contribute to
crime control by investigating and clearing crimes, but frequently employ
an interrogation tactic at cross purposes, making crime more likely. The
benefits of moral minimization are uncertain, and the costs are serious.
III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
The interrogation tactic of moral minimization poses risks. Section
II explains how minimization weakens the internal and informal incentives
to obey the law. Our aim in this article is merely to begin a conversation on
what the appropriate response is. We outline two options: countermessaging and curbing the use of the tactic.

259

There is also a separate normative issue whether victim impact statements
exacerbate criminal law disparities because judges and juries find some victims more
appealing than others for arbitrary or racial reasons. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Threat
Versus Racial Empathy in Sentencing – Capital and Otherwise, 41 AMER. J. CRIM. LAW 1,
13–18, 27–29 (2013); Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 376 (1996).
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A. Counter-Messaging: Neutralizing the Neutralizations
If nothing is done to limit the tactic of moral minimization, perhaps
we could improve the counter-messaging. In Part II-C, we rejected the
argument that various parts of the criminal justice system currently provide
an effective counter-message undoing the harm of moral minimization.260
Among a series of reasons for pessimism, one observation was that if no
one in the criminal system has noticed the danger of moral minimization,
then we cannot expect anyone to have even attempted to formulate the best
counter-message. We are now in a position to ask, can we do better? If the
costs we identify are no longer unexpected, can we retain the tactic but
avoid its harm?
Ultimately, we think the answer is no, but there is room for
improvement. Our focus is on the judge. There is a sentencing hearing after
every conviction in which a judge may justify the announced sentence to
the convicted defendant. Some judges already use this occasion to articulate
the moral wrong of the offense and the basis for the defendant’s
responsibility. Where this message is delivered (perhaps supported by
victim impact testimony), the system is doing all it can (absent a jury
verdict) to create a counter-message to the detective’s moral minimization.
Indeed, this may be an important and neglected justification for a judge
explaining the moral basis of a sentencing decision to a convicted offender:
to undermine the offender’s neutralizations for the crime, which may have
been reinforced in interrogation via moral minimization. Not all judges take
seriously this aspect of sentencing, but our analysis suggests that they
should.
Yet, where the judges take this part of their role seriously, they labor
under disadvantages discussed in Part II-C, one of which is that the judge
usually has no idea what the detectives said to the offender during
interrogation. Unlike the other disadvantages, this one is correctible. As
long as we continue to permit moral minimization, we offer one concrete
reform to improve the expressive position of the judge.

260

See supra Part II-C..
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Our proposal is for pre-sentencing reports to henceforth include a
section summarizing any moral minimization tactics the detectives
employed during an interrogation of the offender, whether or not it led to
incriminating statements. This would permit judges to tailor their remarks at
sentencing to address and reject the specific minimizations the detectives
employed. If the detectives in an embezzlement case blamed the employer
for paying too small a salary, the judge should be informed of this tactic and
then explain to the offender at sentencing why that particular rationalization
is morally unpersuasive.261
B. Limiting the Use of Moral Minimization
Counter-messaging is ultimately insufficient. First, it is not a
solution for the adverse effect of victim-blaming on interrogators and
policing culture. Second, it is not going to work for those exposed to moral
minimizations who are never criminally charged or convicted. Third, we
doubt it could ever completely undo the criminogenic damage for reasons
stated in Part II-C. But even if we are wrong in the abstract, because some
ideal counter-message could work perfectly, in the real world of conviction
by guilty plea, busy judges who will not tailor messages to refute particular
moral minimizations, and the inevitable absence of victims from some
cases, the best counter-messaging plans will often fail.
As previously indicated, there is no serious empirical evidence
supporting the effectiveness of the Reid interrogation methods, much less
the particular tactic of moral minimization.262 Even without absolute clarity
about the precise costs and benefits of minimization, a new
acknowledgement that there are these costs demands recognition of the
tradeoffs in using the strategy. As no one has previously identified the costs
described here, they have been ignored. If detectives sense a possible
benefit, but fail to recognize the risks, they inevitably use the tactic beyond
261

We do not propose that judges use this information to arrive at a sentence. In our
view, the fact that a defendant succumbed to confession because of a moral minimization
tactic is neither a sentencing aggravator nor a mitigator. Rather, the possibility that judges
may have insight into pinpointing the rationale for a defendant’s behavior could actually help
reduce the risk of recurrence if that insight is applied well.
262
See supra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
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the socially optimum level. Some limitation is therefore justified. We
briefly discuss three options. In all cases, the reforms would be
implemented either by state or local legislation or by police department
policy changes.263
One approach would be a presumptive ban, i.e., to prohibit all moral
minimizations except where the tactic would be expected to do the least
harm. As we have discussed above, there are some types of crimes for
which moral minimization is least likely to be criminogenic.264 Murder is an
example where the crime will be punished by such a long prison term that
the concern for recidivism is attenuated.265 There are also particular kinds of
minimizations that are not generalizable, and therefore not likely to
diminish internal and informal incentives to comply with law. We
illustrated again with murder examples, as in a case where detectives
blamed the murder victim for having previously killed a relative of the
suspect, a reason to offend that is usually not likely to repeat itself.266
Considering these two factors on a case-by-case basis would be enormously
complicated, but one could combine these points to justify a workable
regulation that authorized moral minimization tactics in murder
interrogations, but not the interrogation of other crimes.
A more ambitious approach is to abandon wholesale the accusatory
method of interrogation. The Reid method is one of several accusatory or
confrontational interrogation methods, in which the interrogator persistently
asserts confidence in the suspect’s guilt. Broadly speaking, the alternative to
the accusatory method is the information-gathering method. In 1992, police
in the United Kingdom moved from a confrontational interrogation method
to an information-gathering method named PEACE, an acronym for its five
phases – planning/preparation, engage/explain, account (clarification and
challenge), closure, and evaluation.267 The method involves communication
strategies that encourage building rapport and encouraging suspects to
263

See Brandon Garrett, Interrogation Policies, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 95 (2015).
See supra Part II-B.
265
See supra text accompanying note 230.
266
See supra text accompanying notes 228-229.
267
Colin Clarke & Rebecca Milne, National Evaluation of the PEACE Investigative
Interviewing Course 2–3 (Home Office, Report No: PRAS/149, 2001).
264
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develop a painstaking detailed account of events. The suspect is induced to
talk a great deal and on the theory that guilty suspects tend to start
contradicting themselves.268
England and Wales adopted PEACE as a more ethical and
professional approach to investigative questioning in response to several
scandals involving false confessions.269 At least one American jurisdiction
that has adopted PEACE framework for interrogations – Vermont – and
thus we have reason to believe it can be compatible with a U.S. policing and
the constitutional rights that attend the interrogation process.270
A major research question is which method of interrogation is more
successful at securing true confessions while avoiding false confessions.
The existing social science research is unable to provide a definitive answer,
although the existing results favor the information-gathering method.271 The
PEACE model is highly regarded among law enforcement in England in
Wales and has been sought after in Australian, European and North
American jurisdictions.272 At least one other study concluded that PEACE
strategies, when properly used, produced better outcomes with outcomes
defined as either obtaining a fuller version of the occurrence or a
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confession.273 Finally in controlled meta-studies on the cognitive form of
interviewing used in the PEACE framework, the reliability of the
information obtained in the under the PEACE like model was significantly
better.274
These empirical issues are ultimately beyond the scope of this
article. Without resolving the debate, this article contributes to it by
identifying two new costs of the moral minimization tactics that are
exclusively a part of the accusatory method. Our concerns over the
criminogenic and sexist effects of moral minimization add two reasons to
the existing literature for why a switch to an information-gathering method
is desirable.
Which brings us to note the obvious point that if American police
interrogators abandoned the accusatory method and switched to
information-gathering, the problems we identify in this article would
disappear. Prohibiting an interrogation tactic is inherently complicated by
issues of remedy, but the simplest way to stop the use of moral
minimization is to shift entirely away from the accusatory method. What
this would require is less a prohibition of certain methods (although that
might be useful during the transition) than the basic training of detectives in
a new approach. If American police detectives learned from a manual that
did not advocate the reinforcement of neutralizations via moral
minimization, then they would eventually stop using minimizations, at least
not as a central and well-elaborated theme of the interrogation.
V. CONCLUSION
Moral minimization is pervasive in American police interrogations
today, and yet it is a relic of the past. The misogynistic victim-blaming
narratives that the manuals offer to illustrate minimization tactics are every
bit as old as they sound, dating back at least to 1962. We expect twenty-first
century policing to be based on data, as much as possible, and yet these
273
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tactics were created based on early or mid-twentieth century anecdote. The
argument for moral minimization is that “it works,” but there is still no real
social science evidence supporting that claim, and it appears that the newer
alternatives in the United Kingdom and elsewhere also “work,” possibly
better, without minimization.
In 1962, it could not have occurred to anyone that interrogations
with a theme of moral minimization were more or less the precise opposite
procedure as a restorative justice conference, because such conferences did
not (publicly) exist, much less were there randomized controlled trials
demonstrating that the brief conferences could reduce recidivism by
confronting and critiquing the offender’s neutralizations for the crime. In
the mid-twentieth century, there was little in the way of social scientific
empiricism that people obeyed the law in part because they were
reciprocating the perceived compliance of others and also because they
perceived the law to be substantively legitimate. As such, it would not then
have been apparent that the energetic efforts of law enforcement officers to
persuade suspects that “anyone” would have committed the crime in their
place would damage the reciprocity motive for legal compliance, nor that
convincing suspects that the crime is not serious and the blame lies
elsewhere would damage the law’s legitimacy and that motive for
compliance. Yet all of these problems and more are apparent now.
This article proposes balance where none exists. Police officials
gather to discuss crime control, such as how to best deploy patrol officers or
how to maintain their procedural legitimacy. In other meetings, detectives
gather to train for interrogation techniques. These distinct groups never
consider that the training is undermining the crime control. Yet the
explanation for the minimization tactic – that reinforcing the offender’s
neutralizations for the crime will disinhibit the offender’s confession –
necessarily implies that the tactic will also make future offending more
likely. These policing groups might hope that the effects we describe are
small in magnitude or short-lived. We agree that more study is needed, but
hoping is not enough. As long as the interrogation value of moral
minimization is uncertain, we should not continue to ignore the unintended
risks of the tactic when other interrogation methods exist.
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